

dossier 65

Van : DIO/OV

Datum: 20 juni 1983

Aan : A via DRW, Sc DIO, ANPO, Plv. DGIS en S nr. 146/83

Onderwerp: Versterking nucleaire exportregels m.b.t. ultra-centrifuge-technologie

te nemen besluit

Met is de bedoeling dat begin juli een groot aantal industriële landen uit Oost en West in Wenen middels notawisseling overgaat tot formele acceptatie van nieuwe exportregels m.b.t. materialen en uitrusting geschikt voor uraniumverrijking middels het ultra-centrifuge (UC)-procédé. U wordt hierbij verzocht met Nederlandse toetreding tot de regels akkoord te gaan. De minister van EZ zal tevens toestemming moeten verlenen alsmede de uitwerking ervan op zich nemen. Voorzover bekend zijn terzake geen problemen te verwachten. Gaarne spoedig Uw dispositie.

Achtergrond

1. In 1974 kwamen de industriële landen, die partij zijn bij het NPV (Non-Proliferatie Verdrag), tot een akkoord over de lijst van nucleaire materialen en uitrusting die alléén onder safeguards geëxporteerd mochten worden aan niet-kernwapenstaten die geen partij bij het NPV zijn./ Deze "trigger list" gaf wat UC-technologie betreft, slechts een algemene omschrijving van onder exportcontrole te brengen uitrustingsstukken. De technologiehouders hadden in die tijd weinig behoefte al te specifiek terzake te zijn, vooral vanwege geheimhouding.
2. Later bleek dat met name Pakistan allerlei onderdelen van centrifuges in westerse industriële landen aankocht die òf helemaal niet op de "trigger list" stonden òf slechts onder zo'n algemene omschrijving dat exportcontrole juridisch en praktisch onmogelijk was.
3. Enkele jaren geleden werden daarom technische besprekingen gevoerd tussen met name de Troika-landen en de VS om de exportregelingen terzake te verfijnen. Vorig jaar werd dit gezelschap uitgebreid tot de leden van de Zangger-commissie. Frankrijk/zegde aan het VK toe de nieuwe regelingen ook te zullen toepassen.
4. Het bleek mogelijk zowel t.a.v. onderdelen van UC's als t.a.v. bepaalde onderdelen van verrijkingsfabrieken de "trigger list" ad referendum uit te breiden. Juridische en praktische bezwaren werden echter ingebracht tegen opname van uitrusting die ook elders in de industrie wordt gebruikt. Landen als Zwitserland waren bovendien bang dat bepaalde goederen op de te publiceren "trigger list" zouden worden vermeld die strikte interpretatie van de werkingssfeer van het NPV te boven zou gaan. Dit kon negatieve consequenties hebben voor het NPV. De groep landen kwam in de laatste

/De commissie die deze lijst die safeguards "triggert" opstelde, werd naar zijn voorzitter de Zangger-commissie genoemd. (-2-)

MEMORANDUM

Van :

Datum :

Aan :

-2-

Onderwerp :

fase dan ook in twee configuraties bijeen: als Zangger-commissie en als informele groep landen.

5. Ad referendum kwam men tot de volgende afspraken:

- a) De trigger list van de Zangger-regelingen wordt uitgebreid met onderdelen van centrifuges alsmede bepaalde onderdelen van verrijningsinstallaties. Dit wordt in een wederzijdse notawisseling tussen de betrokken landen vastgelegd als verfijning van de bestaande regels. Een en ander wordt tevens medegedeeld aan de Directeur-Generaal van de IAEA conform de eerder gevolgde praktijk.
- b) Ten aanzien van een aantal andere goederen - zoals bepaalde machines en materialen waarmee centrifuges worden vervaardigd - spreken de betrokken landen de intentie uit de export daarvan zonder safeguards tegen te zullen houden als zij redenen hebben te geloven dat deze voor verrijking worden gebruikt. Een en ander wordt vastgelegd door middel van akkoordverklaring met een verslag van de vergadering terzake en wordt niet gepubliceerd. De verschillende documenten zijn bijgevoegd.

./.

6. Met EZ werd nauw overleg gevoerd over de door de Nederlandse deelnemers in te nemen standpunten. Ook werd een expert van UCN ingeschakeld. Met EZ zal nog nader overleg plaatsvinden over de wijze waarop de regelingen in Nederland zullen worden toegepast. Het primaire middel daartoe is in ieder geval uitbreiding van de lijst van goederen die conform het Uitvoerbesluit Strategische Goederen onder exportcontrole zijn gebracht. Aanpassing van de lijst kan vrij snel gebeuren zonder parlementaire behandeling.
7. Niet bekend is of er bij andere landen nog problemen bestaan t.a.v. de aanvaarding van de nieuwe regels. Eén van de lastigste landen, Zwitserland, is inmiddels akkoord gegaan.

conform concept de heer Meerburg

# AMBASSADE VAN HET KONINKRIJK DER NEDERLANDEN

ROYAL NETHERLANDS  
EMBASSY

No. 7209/1330

New Delhi, 5 juli 1983....

Onderwerp: Artikel over Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, Urenco Almelo.

./.


Bijgaand gelieve U aan te treffen copie van twee opeenvolgende berichten uit het Indiase tijdschrift "The Weekly of India" van 22-28 mei en van 5-11 juni jl., betreffende de activiteiten van de Pakistaan Abdul Qadeer Khan bij het ultracentrifuge project bij Urenco.

In de artikelen wordt de nalatigheid van de Nederlandse autoriteiten in deze affaire duidelijk benadrukt.

"The Weekly of India" is een zeer populair tijdschrift met een goede reputatie (onderdeel van de Times of India) met een grote verspreiding over India.

DRW/AT
12 JUL 1983
NUMMER: 185329
DOOR: 813 339.2 PAKISTAN

De Tijdelijk Zaakgelastigde,  
voor deze,



H.E.C. Koets  
Tweede Ambassade-secretaris

Bijlage

De Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken  
te  
Den Haag



# Pakistan's Super Spy—1

Few men have served their country with greater effect and less fanfare than Pakistan's kindly Mr. Khan. A scholar, a brilliant scientist and, on all accounts, a devoted family man, Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan systematically stole the secrets of uranium enrichment from a plant that Britain, West Germany and the Netherlands began to build at Almelo in Holland in 1970. He was, and remains, the principal alchemist who may yet turn Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's dream of endowing Pakistan with an "Islamic bomb" into reality.

The fascinating story of how Dr Khan went, quietly, about his business is pieced together after months of painstaking research by two intrepid journalists, Steve Weismann and Herbert Kronsney. Their account is being exclusively excerpted by the *Weekly* in a two-part series from their definitive book, *The Islamic Bomb*, published by Vision Books Pvt Ltd (Incorporating Orient Paperbacks), New Delhi.

The story of Kahuta and its uranium-enrichment plant begins in Amsterdam in the early 1970s, and it is largely the story of one man—an expatriate Pakistani who ran circles around the lacklustre security schemes of three nations and walked away with the secrets of one of the most highly classified nuclear processes in all of Western Europe. His name is Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan.

A myth in a dozen languages, Khan has emerged in newspapers and magazines throughout Europe as a man of immense mystery—an Islamic blend of James Bond and Dr No, using the magic of the East to steal the secrets of the West. Khan is a super-spook: "The spy of the century." "The spy who stole the bomb for Islam." "The most successful nuclear spy since Klaus Fuchs and Alan Nunn May took their secrets to the Kremlin."

We do not see him that way. In our view, the now legendary Dr Khan appears more a scholar than a spook, a family man without much mystery to him. Like so many others still in similarly sensitive situations, he was just a bright young man from the Third World, one who had been educated in the West and who found himself in a position to do what he thought best for his homeland.

That is also the picture that comes from a close reading of the Dutch Parliamentary report on the subsequent security scandal issued in the spring of 1980, and from a series of interviews by the BBC *Panorama* team — on which one of us was a member—with people who knew Khan in Europe. Born in 1936 in Bhopal, in what was then British India, Khan came to Europe to complete his studies in the early 1960s. He went first to Germany, to the Technische Universitat in West Berlin, where he

became fluent in German. Then to Holland, where he took a degree in metallurgical engineering at the prestigious Technical University of Delft between 1963 and 1967. And finally to Belgium, where he finished his PhD at the Catholic University of Leuven in 1972.

One of those who knew him best during these student days was his mentor at Leuven, Professor M.J. Brabers. Interviewed there in the spring of 1980, Dr Brabers recalled Khan as "a competent scientist," though "not really a genius." But what Brabers remembered best about the young Pakistani was his ability to make friends.

Khan was outgoing, charming, and highly likeable. Unlike many Pakistanis, whom Brabers found quite class conscious, Khan could get along with anyone, from the people who cleaned the workshop to the most respected scientists.

"I don't know how, but he managed to make friends all over the world," recalled Brabers. If Khan admired a scientist, or if he needed some information, he would sit down and jot off a note. His enthusiasm and willingness to ask questions won him access that few other graduate students could get.

Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan ... the most successful nuclear spy since Klaus Fuchs and Alan Nunn May took their secrets to the Kremlin.

—The Observer, London,  
December 1979




ILLUSTRATION BY FRANCIS H. DSA

At one point, Dr Brabers worked with Khan in editing a book on physical metallurgy, a *festschrift* for an older professor at the Technical University of Delft. What amazed Brabers was how the young Khan made contact with top scientists around the world, and how he succeeded in getting them to contribute articles to the book.

Brabers also recalled that Khan, as a Muslim, would not eat pork or drink alcohol. But he was by no means a fanatic.

"He was proud of his country," Brabers remembers. "He also had the same attitude as everybody else in Pakistan, that they were not well treated by other countries, particularly the Western countries. But Khan was not nationalistic, not in the old sense. He had an international mind, he could live in any country, I think, and that's what he tried to do for his first job."

This was in 1972, and the job was in Amsterdam, at a specialised engineering firm, The Physical Dynamics Research Laboratory, or FDO. The post had not been advertised. A former fellow student from Delft headed FDO's metallurgical section and was familiar with Khan's talents. He jumped at the chance to put Khan on his elite team.

A subsidiary of the major Dutch firm Verenigde Machine-Fabrieken, FDO worked closely with one of the key nuclear projects in Europe. This was Urenco, a joint venture of the governments of Great Britain, West Germany, and the Netherlands. No longer willing to depend on the United States for nuclear fuel, the three nations had created Urenco

in 1970 to guarantee a steady supply of enriched uranium to fuel their nuclear power plants. They were building a jointly owned uranium-enrichment plant in Holland, at the town of Almelo.

The plant was to use a new and highly classified technology—the ultracentrifuge. Made of finely machined, high-strength steel alloys, thousands of these ultracentrifuges would spin a gas of uranium hexafluoride at incredible speeds, as fast as 100,000 revolutions a minute. This would physically separate the two different isotopes found in natural uranium—the heavier, garden variety uranium 238 from the marginally lighter, far rarer and very fissionable uranium 235. The plant would then bring the separated streams of uranium gas back together, but with a higher proportion of the uranium 235.

The process called for the finest precision. The difference in weight between the isotopes is minuscule, and the natural uranium contains only a very small proportion of the prized uranium 235, about seven parts in a thousand, or 0.7 per cent. For fuel, the standard light-water power reactors require that the mixture be "enriched" to some 3 per cent of the uranium 235. Many research reactors—and also nuclear weapons—require highly enriched uranium, which is enriched to as much as 93 per cent of the uranium 235.

FDO, and now Dr Khan, served as subcontractors and consultants on the ultracentrifuge process. For Khan, this was a unique opportunity. He could strengthen his knowledge and experience in his field of specialisation, the use of exotic metals to withstand the strains caused by the immense speed of centrifuges. And he would gain knowledge and experience in the new top secret use of ultracentrifuges in the enrichment of uranium.

Because of the secrecy surrounding the ultracentrifuge process, the three nations in Ureenco had agreed on tough security, and as a major subcontractor, FDO was required to get security clearances for its employees, including the expatriate Khan. FDO recommended Khan strongly to the Ureenco management and praised his talent as a metallurgist. The firm also noted that Khan had been in the West for eleven years and planned to settle, preferably in Holland, and that he was married "to a Dutch wife."

The Dutch security service—the BVD—took the information and ran a cursory check on Dr Khan. The check found nothing suspicious, and the BVD quickly approved a limited clearance, "secret inclusive." Much to its later chagrin, the BVD missed a number of details, such as the fact that Khan's wife was not Dutch at all, but a Dutch-speaking South African with a British passport.

The Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs gave its approval. From what we have learned, they were under the impression that the Pakistani metallurgist would not work directly on the ultracentrifuge project, and that he would only come into contact with low-security data.

Once cleared and at work, however, the likeable Dr Khan fit right in.

"He was an amusing person," another of his old friends, Dr Georges van der Perre, recalled. "For instance, he was always offering cookies and sweets to the secretaries because in his idea a girl should be a little fatty."

Khan's command of Dutch was adequate, even good. But, as Dr van der Perre remembers, Khan had his own Pakistani accent that "sounded funny a little bit."

With his Dutch-speaking wife, Henny, and their two young daughters, Khan moved into the tidy suburb of Zwanenburg, not far from Amsterdam's Schiphol Airport. The family blended easily into the community. Everything about their home at 71 Amstelse Street was normal and instantly forgettable, down to the lace curtains and potted plants in

## COVER STORY

the windows.

The Khans were good neighbours and good friends. They were also a typical young family, taking trips to the seaside, to the Ardennes, and sometimes to his old university at Leuven.

On occasion, there were neighbourhood volleyball games, and Khan is still remembered for his "special style." "He was smashing from all parts of the court," one of the neighbours related. "His way of playing was rather unconventional, but effective because his smashes were dangerous."

At work and at play, this seemed to be the most menacing thing anyone remembers about the charming Pakistani. But volleyball was not the only game that Khan would come to play.



Pakistan's Munir A. Khan of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

officially engaged in only limited metallurgical research for the ultracentrifuge project. But with the laxity in enforcing the security rules, he apparently visited Almelo repeatedly, and also had access to Ureenco information without having to go to the plant.

One of his jobs was to translate technical documents, which Khan repeatedly took home with him, all with the permission of FDO. He had every opportunity to see Almelo's complete design plans, which were available at another section of FDO's parent company. And, in many ways most important, he gained an inside knowledge of the firms supplying components for the ultracentrifuges.

In retrospect, it is obvious that the Pakistani was in a perfect position to pry away the secrets of the ultracentrifuge. But there is no evidence to suggest



Dr Chris van der Klaauw, former Dutch Foreign Minister.

FDO, his new firm, had a friendly, free-wheeling atmosphere, and Khan soon had the run of the place. In this, he was no different from anyone else. No one at FDO seems to have taken security as a serious matter, and this quickly opened the door for Khan to enter the Ureenco plant itself.

According to the official Dutch report on the "Khan Affair," his first visit to the factory at Almelo was on May 8 and 9, 1972, only about a week after he started work. FDO wanted him to familiarise himself with the general procedures at Ureenco, become knowledgeable about the operation and also to look into an important aspect of his

He was an amusing person. For instance, he was always offering cookies and sweets to the secretaries because in his idea a girl should be a little fatty.

—Dr Georges van der Perre,  
Catholic University of Leuven

specially, the strengthening of the metals used in the centrifuges.

It was all harmless enough. But it was also a breach of security. Khan and his employers had violated—perhaps unwittingly—the supposedly rigid security regulations agreed on by the three Ureenco nations, and all this even before Khan could settle down to his normal routine.

In the following months and years, Khan was

that Khan took the job to spy, or that the Pakistanis had purposely planted him in FDO to infiltrate Ureenco.

Instead, it appears that Khan began working for the Pakistani Government only as late as 1974, possibly after the Indian nuclear test in May. Neighbours remember that cars with diplomatic plates from Belgium and France began showing up in the later part of the year, and that the visitors often stayed until the early hours of the morning.

The neighbours noticed the cars, but hardly gave them a second thought. They simply assumed that Khan, like any foreign professional, had close friends in his country's various embassies. At least that is how they saw it until some five years later, when all the pieces began to come together.

Whether Khan sought out the Pakistanis, or they recruited him, is still not known. But one might expect a first-rate expatriate scientist to bring matters of interest to his government's attention, if only to guarantee a good job should he ever decide to return home.

In any case, Khan was almost certainly working for Islamabad by the fall of 1974, when he made his most important visit to the Almelo plant. Ureenco wanted him to translate part of a top-secret technical report from German to Dutch.

The report concerned a major breakthrough in centrifuge technology, and one with a fascinating history. This was the vertical centrifuge method, and it went back to research during World War II, when Nazi scientists were rushing to forge the ultimate weapon for Hitler. The Russians later perfected the method with the help of some of the same Nazi scientists, and now the secret had returned to Germany, where scientists had de-

ILLUSTRATIONS BY ANIL NAIK

developed experimentally. Urenco hoped to incorporate the new method, and the report was part of the effort.

Officially seconded to Urenco to help with the technical translation, Khan worked at Almelo for some sixteen days over a period of three or four weeks. He worked inside the complex itself, and was given a desk in one of the most sensitive sections, where the final planning and design work were executed. The section was aptly called the "brain box."

A temporary building set apart from the centrifuge facility, the brainbox was supposed to keep the tightest security. Regulations required that all desks and offices remain locked. All work was to be strictly compartmentalised. And all information was to be restricted to those with "the need to know."

A temporary building set apart from the centrifuge facility, the brainbox was supposed to keep the tightest security. This was the rule. The practice was something else.

These were the rules. The practice was something else. According to the official Dutch report, the brainbox had a decidedly "free atmosphere." Just as at FDO, no one put any special emphasis on security. Technicians and engineers spoke freely. Anyone in the brainbox was assumed to have passed the strictest security check. And Dr Khan, the nice Pakistani chap from FDO, was just one of the boys.

The brainbox was a separate building, but the lax security spilled over to the main plant. That is where the centrifuges were. It is also where the toilets were, and the canteen, where the boys from the brainbox gathered for snacks and coffee.

Khan could hardly have done better. For sixteen days he had access to both the brainbox and the centrifuges. It was a rare opportunity, and it appears that Dr Khan made the most of it, even with his limited security clearance.

On one occasion, a colleague noticed that Khan was making notes in a foreign script. The man assumed that Khan was writing in his native language, and asked what he was writing. The friendly Pakistani smiled and said that he had been writing a letter to his family back home.

Another staff member repeatedly saw Khan touring the centrifuge facility, notebook in hand. The staff member thought nothing of it, and only reported what he had seen after the scandal broke.

Inside the brainbox, Khan shared an office with a technician who was also working on the same German centrifuge project. The technician was not always at his desk, and it is likely that Khan saw the documents the man was working on.

Khan finished his sixteen-day secondment at Almelo without arousing suspicion, and returned to his normal routine at FDO, where he continued to have access to information on the ultracentrifuges. But during the following year, Khan grew careless, and several incidents brought him to the attention of the Dutch authorities. In one of the more blatant, he asked an FDO colleague to come home with him to photograph some ultracentrifuge drawings that he happened to have.

The authorities did not seem overly concerned. Then in October 1975, the Ministry of Economic Affairs asked FDO to shift Khan to a new post where he would no longer have anything to do with the ultracentrifuge project. FDO agreed, and Khan's usefulness in Amsterdam came to an end,

at least for his Pakistani friends. It was time for Khan to come in from the cold.

The rest is detail. Two months later, on December 15, Khan and his wife, Henny, and their two daughters left on a trip. According to a neighbour, their departure was sudden. Henny then wrote to several friends and neighbours. The Khans were in Pakistan taking a vacation. Her husband had fallen ill with yellow fever, and they would be staying for another eight weeks. Shortly afterwards, Khan wrote to FDO. He had decided not to return to Holland, and was submitting his resignation, to take effect from March 1, 1976.

FDO was sorry to lose such a good metallurgist. The Dutch authorities took little notice. And the neighbours were not especially surprised. Their only concern was that Henny might find it difficult to fit into Pakistani society.

"We also knew that his family, the family clan, let's say, was urging him and putting pressure on him to come home to Pakistan," one of Khan's Dutch friends explained. "It wasn't so strange. We said, 'Okay, the family has won the boy back!'"

Everything seemed so natural. Henny returned to Holland for a short time to wrap up the family's affairs and continued to send Christmas cards to the neighbours. Khan also stayed in touch, and let his friends know that he had taken a new job in his own country. A little hush-hush, perhaps. But clearly a big job.

"I was happy that he got the job in Pakistan," one of his closest Dutch colleagues recalled. "I had insisted already for several years that he should return to Pakistan because I saw his future more in Pakistan than in Holland."

It was only later that Khan's friends would come to learn what the kindly Dr Khan was really doing.

From Ali Bhutto's first meeting with his top scientists under the tent at Multan in 1972, the Pakistanis had seen plutonium as their easiest way to the Islamic bomb. They had a stock of plutonium in the spent fuel from their Candu reactor at Karachi, and the reprocessing technology needed to extract it was widely understood, easily available, and relatively cheap.

But Mr Bhutto and his scientists had also shown an early interest in the far more difficult and tightly guarded processes of enrichment. "We considered it as a possibility," recalls Mr K, the Pakistani official active in the Paris meetings with Libya in 1973. "We wanted to find out what it was about, what it would mean for us to understand this kind of programme."

The Pakistanis pursued their interest quite openly, especially in France. According to one of the secret aides-memoires now in our possession, Bhutto's scientists asked the French Atomic Energy Commission in 1974 if it would train some Pakistanis in enrichment know-how, including the new laser and ultracentrifuge technologies. This was at the time the Pakistanis were concluding their final negotiations with SGN for the Chashma reprocessing plant, and the French refused. Reprocessing, maybe. Enrichment, never.

At this point, the Bhutto government saw enrichment technology as only something to think about. By the summer of 1975, however, the Pakistanis were showing signs of a major new commitment—to go for ultracentrifuge enrichment as well as reprocessing. And since no one was going to build an ultracentrifuge plant for them, they set about building it themselves. Buying the components they would need piece by piece.

The first clue came in August 1975, while Dr Khan was still at FDO. The Pakistani Embassy in Brussels wrote to a firm in Holland inquiring about high-frequency transformers, or inverters. These

are sophisticated electronic devices needed to control the spinning of the centrifuges, and Pakistan's continuing pursuit of them would leave a trail from Holland to at least four other countries over the course of the next five years.

Once Dr Khan returned to Pakistan in the fall of 1975, Bhutto and his scientists set out on a crash program. They would start with a small ultracentrifuge pilot plant in the town of Sihala, a few miles south and east of Islamabad. Then, a bit farther down the road at the little village of Kahuta, they would build a massive industrial plant, with as many as 10,000 ultracentrifuge units.

Both Sihala and Kahuta are virtually in the backyard of Pinstech, with its reprocessing pilot plant, all of which gives the Islamabad area a formidable "nuclear park."

In retrospect, the new scheme was amazingly audacious. It was an alternative in case the French pulled out of Chashma, as they later tried to do, and a way to get nuclear explosive material unhampered by any international agreements. None of the IAEA safeguards would apply to the Sihala or Kahuta projects, since the Pakistanis have never declared the existence of the facilities to the IAEA, and thus none of the enrichment equipment could be subject to international controls.

The Pakistanis called their new initiative Project 706, and as with the reprocessing program, it was under the overall supervision of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission and its chief, Munir Ahmed Khan. Bhutto also brought in the military's Special Works Organisation to oversee the construction at Kahuta and to help with the purchases. Fresh from the field, Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan took charge of the new Engineering Research Laboratory, where he worked on the design of the new ultracentrifuges and also put together a shopping list of the components needed to build them.

For Dr Khan, no relation to his new boss, Munir Khan, this was a dream come true. He had already shown that he was quick and resourceful. Now he would prove that he could handle one of the Third World's most ambitious engineering projects, building a little Almelo in Pakistan.

"He had a good setup, a good organisation," explained his old mentor, Professor Brabers, who visited Khan in Pakistan. "He could choose the people he really wanted. He knew who the good people were. He gave them good salaries so they would not want to leave the job."

"What can lead to a nuclear weapon? Nuts and bolts can lead to a nuclear weapon. So where do you draw the line?"

"Also in buying equipment, he knew all the companies; he knew so many people abroad in many countries," Brabers continued. "Why, he knew so many languages, and he is so charming (that) he managed to buy many things that other Pakistanis would not manage to buy."

Much of the buying itself fell to a network headed by a superb man in the field, Mr S. A. Butt. One of the participants at the original meeting in Multan, Butt had caught Ali Bhutto's eye when he jumped up and shouted that the bomb could be built in three years. He was obviously wrong, but his enthusiasm won favour, and in July 1975, he was posted to the Pakistani Embassy in Brussels, in charge of science and technology.

In Brussels, and later in Paris, Butt spent much of his time working on the reprocessing side with Belgonucleaire and SOG. At the same time he also became the chief purchasing agent in Europe for the items on Dr Khan's shopping list, and was

almost certainly the man responsible for the inquiry about inventors in Holland in August 1975.

But from a super secret band of smugglers, Butt and his colleagues pursued their purchases in a surprisingly open way—at least at the start of their buying campaign. Butt and some of the others were accredited diplomats. They worked out of the Pakistani Embassies or offices linked to them. They told many of the suppliers what they were buying the components for. They made no secret of their requests. But to do so doing they acted with a blatant disregard for the various national and international agencies that were supposed to be stopping the spread of dangerous nuclear technologies.

The buying campaign began in earnest in 1976, following the initial inquiries the year before, and the Pakistanis made one of their first stops in Switzerland. Their reception could not have been warmer, as we learned during extensive investigations in 1980.

The buyers—three still unnamed Pakistanis—went first to the little town of Haag on the border with Liechtenstein, to a firm called Vakuum Appart Technik, or VAT. A widely known manufacturer of highly specialised valves, VAT exports to nuclear and other industries all over the world. The Pakistanis were astonishingly frank. Would VAT supply them with high-vacuum valves for a centrifuge enrichment plant?

VAT was happy to oblige. As a good Swiss firm, however, they checked first with the government in Berne to see if such a sale was permitted. Berne answered by the book. The bureaucrats sent VAT a list of the regulations, including the "trigger list" laid down by the nuclear exporting nations in the London Club. Complete centrifuge units were listed, and could only be exported to safeguarded facilities, which the Pakistan enrichment plant was not. High-vacuum valves were not listed, even if expressly intended for a centrifuge enrichment unit.

The valves might be necessary to the centrifuge. But, in the logic of the London Club list, they were not part of the centrifuge unit itself. They were not "nuclear sensitive," and did not directly separate the two different uranium isotopes, uranium 235 and uranium 238.

Rules are rules, especially to the Swiss, and VAT sold the Pakistanis the valves.

"The parts for Pakistan were not crucial components," a VAT official told us. "They were not parts for isotope-separation equipment."

Well pleased with the robust and businesslike attitude towards free trade in Switzerland, the Pakistanis went next to the picturesque Chur Valley, where they found a new firm called CORA Engineering. This time the Pakistanis were not asking about minor parts. They wanted a major component—a gassification and solidification unit to feed uranium hexafluoride gas into the centrifuges, and then to transform it back into a solid at the end of the centrifuge process.

The Pakistanis told CORA exactly what they wanted, and what they wanted it for, and CORA checked with Berne. Once again the London Club had not listed the item as nuclear sensitive, and once again Berne saw no problem in the sale.

"We made sure we were not violating any existing agreements and existing regulations," CORA's Rudolf Walti told us, in an interview later broadcast on the BBC. "We were told this (sale) would not touch any of these restrictions. In fact, that it wouldn't even need an export permit."

Mr Walti knew, as did officials in Berne, that the Pakistanis needed the CORA unit for the centrifuges to enrich uranium. Without it, the centrifuges would not work. But Walti was not troubled.

"We are not producing revolvers or cannons, and we are not producing bombs," he argued. "We are not involved in nuclear weapons in any respect, because we wouldn't even know how to

make a nuclear weapon."

M. Poincent, at SGN in France, had said almost the same thing in defending the sale of the reprocessing plant to Pakistan. Only Mr Walti, at CORA, was even more emphatic. "There comes really a question of nuts and bolts," he insisted. "What can lead to a nuclear weapon? That is the question, of course. Nuts and bolts can lead to a nuclear weapon. So where do you draw the line?"

For Mr Walti and his firm, the answer was easy, and in the summer of 1978, CORA Engineering completed the "nuts and bolts". Elaborately designed and carefully engineered, the gassification and solidification unit was one of the largest single components that the Pakistanis ordered in Europe, and it took three specially chartered Hercules C-130 transport planes to fly the completed plant to Pakistan.

The Pakistani buying campaign also showed up big and brazen in Holland, where Dr Khan knew many of the suppliers personally. As in Switzerland, the purchases appear to have started seriously in 1976, following the initial inquiry on inventors the year before, and most of the known orders were for specialised tubes and steel.

For Dr Khan, this was a dream come true. Now he would prove that he could handle one of the Third World's most ambitious engineering projects.

The obvious starting point was Khan's old employers FDO, though their exact role remains a mystery. We know that a member of the FDO staff went to Pakistan on an unspecified mission in September 1976. The following June, two of Khan's Pakistani colleagues returned the visit. They brought with them a letter from Khan asking for spare parts and certain data on the ultracentrifuge process. On Khan's behalf, the two Pakistanis suggested that they could arrange a trip to Pakistan for one of the FDO staff, and possibly make it worth his while financially. The Pakistanis also suggested that another of Khan's ex-colleagues might come along. In the event, FDO apparently discouraged the idea, and the two Dutchmen declined the kind offer.

The Pakistanis got a much better response from a second company, Van Doorne Transmissie, and in 1976, they placed an initial order for tubes of specially hardened steel. Dr Khan himself showed up at Van Doorne the following year, and raised the order to 6,500 of the special tubes. This was a staggering amount and workers at the company began to call it "the Pakistani Pipeline".

The Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs got wind of the order, and one of its officials came to the plant. He was told that the tubes were for use in a Pakistani ultracentrifuge process, and unlike the Swiss, the Dutch authorities told Van Doorne to stop. But the government could not invoke any specific export regulation against the tubes, and Van Doorne went ahead with the bulk of the order, shipping out the last consignment in September 1979. The order was just too big to turn down, even at the risk of government hostility.

The Pakistanis also placed orders with other Dutch firms for aluminium tubes, and in the spring of 1977, at a meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, a Dutch engineer reportedly showed some amazed Indian scientists a photocopy of an enormous Pakistani order for martensitic steel, an alloy so hard and strong and expensive that it is used almost exclusively for jet

plane engines and gas centrifuges. It was an obvious tip-off to Pakistani plans, but no one—not even the Indians—thought it worth informing the authorities or asking for an official investigation to stop it. In any case, to whom would they have been able to turn? That was one of the problems. The international agencies such as the IAEA had no policing power. And selling the martensitic steel was not in and of itself illegal, neither internationally nor in any of the individual Western nations.

The buying campaign in West Germany was even more shadowy, though the Pakistanis thought it important enough to have a special buying office in the country. This was in a small village called Watchberg-Poch, some twenty miles from the Pakistani Embassy in Bonn, and it was headed by an accredited Pakistani diplomat called Kamal ul-Haq Khan, who set up shop in January 1977. This Mr Khan was from the military's Special Works Organisation, and worked closely with a Minister at the Pakistani Embassy in Bonn, Mr Abdul Waheed.

One of the few known suppliers in Germany was a firm in Hanau, Leybold Heraeus. One of the world's foremost manufacturers of vacuum technology, the company sold the Pakistanis vacuum pumps and equipment for gas purification, at a cost of 6 million deutschmarks. No special export license was required, and the firm later told the German magazine *Der Spiegel* that the equipment "could be bought anywhere".

A second company—Aluminium Walzwerke of Singen—supplied a reported 40 million deutschmarks of material, including rolled rods and some 10,000 small aluminium parts specially welded according to detailed plans supplied by the Pakistanis. None of it was on any "banned" list of nuclear equipment.

"Misuse of these parts cannot be (prevented)," a company spokesman told *Der Spiegel*. "Export business is not equipped to do that." He pointed out that the parts could be used in a variety of non-nuclear items, and it was not the job of his company to investigate the final use of standard items sold without restriction throughout the world. Several other German firms are believed to have supplied the Pakistani centrifuge project, but at least one turned them down. This was a firm that also acted as an agent for enrichment services from the Soviet Union, Rohstoff-Einfuhr.

The firm's president, Alfred Hempel, said that the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission initially contacted him by telex directly from Islamabad. Mr Butt, in Paris, then followed up with three or four telephone calls, explaining that he was acting on the Atomic Energy Commission's behalf.

The Pakistanis wanted ten to fifteen tonnes of uranium yellow-cake, or an equivalent amount in the form of uranium hexafluoride, which would have been needed only for the enrichment plant.

Hempel knew where to find the yellow-cake. That was in South Africa, and he telexed his contacts there to see what was available. At the same time, he needed to get permission to sell the uranium and got in touch with German governmental authorities in Bonn to see if the deal was all right.

It was "no" all the way around. Bonn forbade the delivery because Pakistan had never signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty and Germany's international agreements required that uranium yellow-cake—unlike the individual parts of the centrifuge technology—must be subject to IAEA monitoring. South Africa telexed back and asked who the customer was, and when Hempel said Pakistan, the South African Government refused.

"Butt called," Hempel confided. "And he pressed us and asked for our decision." The decision had to be no. Mr Butt would have to find some other way to meet his urgent need for uranium.

(To be continued)



# Pakistan's Super Spy- 2

Having obtained the requisite know-how on the construction of a centrifuge, so vital for the production of enriched uranium necessary to make a hydrogen bomb, Pakistan embarked on a shopping spree in Europe to set up the same. And, the authors, Steve Wiesmann and Herbert Kronsney, attribute Pakistan's "dramatic" advancement in the direction of uranium enrichment, mainly to the skill of "the kindly Dr Khan".

The Pakistanis also ran their buying campaign in France, where Mr Butt moved from Belgium in February 1977. As far as is known, most of the purchases in France itself were for reprocessing, and only a few for the enrichment project.

One is especially interesting. The Pakistanis had approached a well-known firm in northern France and arranged to buy as many as 10,000 bellows for the ultracentrifuges. French Customs officials forbade the sale, and according to one diplomatic source, who cannot be named, the company managed to send part of the order through a firm in Belgium, along with the dies to enable the Pakistanis to make the rest themselves.

But the best-known purchases were in Britain, where the Pakistanis placed at least three orders, two of them for those tell-tale high-frequency inverters. These were the same inverters that the Pakistani Embassy in Brussels had been pursuing in Holland in 1975, and the orders ended up creating such a furore that the press and television from a number of countries came to cover the story.

The Pakistanis gave the job of buying the inverters to a British subject of Indian Muslim origin called Abdus Salam. This is not the Abdus Salam who won the Nobel Prize in physics, but a small businessman living comfortably in north London. A British official we checked with told us this Salam was also an old friend of Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan.

Starting in the end of 1977, Salam set up a series of new companies, among them Weargate Ltd. The companies were never much more than names, and in at least four of them, Salam had the same British partner, an engineer from South Wales called Peter Griffin.

Salam and Griffin first showed up on the Pakistani circuit with an order for thirty inverters. This was in 1977, and the order went to a British subsidiary of the giant American firm Emerson Electric, which shipped the inverters to the Pakistan Army's Special Works Organisation in Rawalpindi in August 1978. The invoice went to Weargate in Britain.

For reasons that are still not clear, the Pakistanis passed the order through a commission agent in Lennep, West Germany—Team Industries. According to Team's Mr Plifffe, he had been contacted by the Pakistanis in Paris, almost certainly Mr Butt, who had told him that Pakistan needed ten inverters for the kind of centrifuges used in a re-enrichment plant.

The Pakistanis—through Team and Weargate—placed two additional orders with Emerson in

Britain, including one for about sixty high-frequency inverters. The Pakistanis also approached an Emerson plant in the United States—the company's Industrial Controls Division in Santa Ana, California, as confirmed to us by a company spokesman during the summer of 1981. The American division refused to accept the order, possibly at the intervention of the American Government. But Britain's Emerson Electric did accept. Did they know what the inverters were for?

A former engineer at the British plant in Swindon told us that anyone who was anyone in the firm would assume that the inverters were for uranium enrichment. But they were not overly concerned because they were convinced that the Pakistanis would never know how to operate such sophisticated equipment, and that the inverters would all sit in their packing cases until they rusted away. This was the attitude until a few days after the first shipment reached Pakistan, when Emerson received a telex requesting a long list of extremely complex modifications. As the engineer described it, this meant another Anglo-Saxon prejudice about Pakistani "incompetence" went down the drain.

Still, the Emerson plant filled the first two orders, and would have filled the third except for an unexpected intervention. This came in July 1978, when a leading Labour Party Member of Parliament, Mr Frank Allaun, raised an embarrassing question in the House of Commons.

"Was the British Government aware that the firm Emerson Electric had supplied Pakistan with a

*The impressive Radiation Genetics Institute at Lyallpur, established by the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission.*



quantity of special inverters for driving ultracentrifuges in a uranium-enrichment plant," he asked.

What were the inverters to be used for? he wanted to know. And had the export been approved by British Customs?

Allaun later told the *ZDF Magazin* programme on German television one of the reasons he was so troubled by the sale.

"These converters are of the same kind, and have the same frequency, as those ordered by the British Atomic Energy Authority," he explained. "They are unsuitable as a control system in a textile factory."

Perhaps the most interesting, and least known, part of the story is how Allaun learned of the Emerson orders. Allaun will not say. But some reports mentioned that a worker from the Emerson plant approached him during a labour dispute, while the London *Observer* suggested that the information came from the Israelis, though no one has suggested how the Israelis would have learned about it.

In any case, Allaun has a long history of interest in nuclear disarmament, and he pressed the issue with the like-minded Minister of Energy at the time, Mr Tony Benn, who instigated a full-scale investigation.

One of the first things the investigation found was especially disturbing. The export of the inverters was completely legal, and Emerson actually shipped the first of them to the Pakistanis after Allaun raised the question in the Commons. The three months the Government took to examine the problem enabled the shipment to be made. The British then added high-frequency inverters to the export control list, which effectively stopped Emerson from supplying Pakistan with any more of them.

"In the end we used the trading powers under the embargo procedure that we had in order to stop this apparently quite innocent sale of inverters which were clearly intended for the purpose of building the Pakistan bomb," Benn later explained to the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation's *Fifth Estate*. "We acted in a way that was right and proper," Benn concluded. "But I have a sort of feeling it wasn't effective, and that what President Bhutto began and President Zia continued is going to be, if it isn't already, a nuclear weapon in Pakistan."

Benn's pessimism is easily understood. The new regulation was only a one-shot remedy. The Pakistanis continued to shop in Britain for other, non-prohibited items for their centrifuge project, and the British were forced to expand their export regulations twice in the opening months of 1979—first to stop the export of inverter parts and sub-assemblies, and then to prohibit the sale of any parts or equipment specially designed for the centrifuge process. The clever Pakistanis were staying a step ahead of the game by buying the individual parts and assembling more and more of the equipment themselves in Pakistan itself.

For all the difficulties, Allaun's question in the Commons started the ball rolling. Tony Benn's investigation uncovered much of what the Pakistani network was trying to buy in Britain. The British talked to their partners in Urenco and the London Club, who began their own investigations. The media followed after. In time, the new interest would pose the first significant challenge to the Pakistani enrichment project.

The case of the Emerson inverters signaled the first public recognition that the Pakistanis were pursuing enrichment as well as reprocessing as a way to nuclear weapons. Yet the Pakistanis had

openly inquiring about centrifuge equipment since 1975, nearly three years before, and various government agencies in Western Europe had done little to stop them or to spread the word about what they were doing.

In short, security was appalling, and the international guidelines of the London Club woefully inadequate. Here was one of the most dangerous nuclear technologies, and the Pakistanis were buying it on the open market, barely bothering to ask what they were doing. Their trail was everywhere. But no one had shown any interest in following it.

The biggest scandal was in Holland, where the low publicity in early 1979 finally opened up the story of Dr Khan. What secrets had the Pakistani taken? And how had he gotten away so easily?

There was plenty to go around. Urenco blamed FDO for hiring Khan. FDO blamed the Ministry of Economic Affairs, which had approved Khan's security clearance. The Ministry blamed Urenco for not informing the internal security service about Khan's repeated visits to the Almelo plant. And the Dutch internal security service blamed the Dutch overseas intelligence service for not making a proper assessment of Pakistan's intentions from the beginning.

The fact is that in the Hague every responsible agency is shoveling responsibility for this onto someone else," recalled one of the first Dutch journalists on the story, An Salomonsson of *NRC Handelsblad*. "The buck-passing is particularly evident between the Ministry of Trade and the Ministry of Interior."

The buck passing continued, and the Dutch parliament finally set up an official Commission of Enquiry, which issued its report in the spring of 1980. The language was careful to the point of being. But the conclusion was clear enough.


Although no absolute proof is forthcoming, it is accepted... that Engineer Dr Khan has been able to assist Pakistan in acquiring essential ultracentrifuge know-how," said the Commission. Rather predictably, the report recommended a tightening up of security, a tightening up of export regulations, and the possible prosecution of Dutch firms that have exported to Pakistan. So far there have been some changes in export regulations, but no prosecutions.

In the meantime, Holland's friends and allies are reacting sharply. Britain and West Germany—the other partners in Urenco—wanted to know why Holland had not caught the Khan affair to their attention back in 1975, when suspicions first arose. Or in 1976 and 1977 when FDO and others told Dutch authorities about Khan's centrifuge project back in Pakistan. Israel was even angrier. In January 1979, Prime Minister Menachem Begin sent his Dutch counterpart a strongly worded letter. Why had the Dutch omitted the nuclear sales to Pakistan? And what steps would they now take to stop them? The Dutch promised to investigate. Under pressure from Begin and the other nations' queries and protests, they issued their formal study in the spring of 1980, as noted earlier.

Begin also raised a spectre that later proved false—that the Pakistanis had received funds for their nuclear project from Libya's Colonel Qaddafi. These attitudes towards the Jewish state and the Arab need no elaboration. Only the French seemed secretly delighted at Khan's plight. The perpetual odd man out in the Western nuclear world, they had not been invited into Urenco, and were now happy to see the British and their Urenco partners carry the can for making Pakistan the bomb. The French themselves almost took the credit for their role in the reprocessing plant. Their attitude now was "Don't blame us. Blame them."

But the strongest response in both the American and British intelligence communities was to the fact that the Khan affair came from the United States, where the Carter Administration once again took the lead in trying to stop the nuclear spread. As in Britain, the first problem Washington faced was to try to tighten up the export regulations, which was not as easy as it might seem. American exporters do not like restrictions or added paperwork any more than do their European competitors, and the Department of Commerce and other business-minded bureaucrats dragged their feet before adding any new items to the control list, especially where the parts or equipment had both conventional and nuclear applications.

In theory, the solution was easy: Define the items requiring special export licences in the tightest terms possible. In practice, that created new problems. By specifying a special variation of an otherwise standard industrial product, the Americans would be telling a would-be nuclear nation exactly what it might need to get the bomb. A US State Department official explained to us that the international consultations required to establish permissible and non-permissible items in itself created delays, so that it is likely that some essential equipment did get through to Pakistan, including some of the high-frequency inverters.



Copies of those seemingly innocent orders placed by Pakistan to get vital equipment for its centrifuges Team Industries' order for 31 sets of input transformers (left) and, the order that gave Pakistan's secret away (right).

case and the Khan affair came from the United States, where the Carter Administration once again took the lead in trying to stop the nuclear spread.

As in Britain, the first problem Washington faced was to try to tighten up the export regulations, which was not as easy as it might seem. American exporters do not like restrictions or added paperwork any more than do their European competitors, and the Department of Commerce and other business-minded bureaucrats dragged their feet before adding any new items to the control list, especially where the parts or equipment had both conventional and nuclear applications.

In theory, the solution was easy: Define the items requiring special export licences in the tightest terms possible. In practice, that created new problems. By specifying a special variation of an otherwise standard industrial product, the Americans would be telling a would-be nuclear nation exactly what it might need to get the bomb.

A US State Department official explained to us that the international consultations required to establish permissible and non-permissible items in itself created delays, so that it is likely that some essential equipment did get through to Pakistan, including some of the high-frequency inverters.

Trying to put their own house in order, the Americans also tried to find out just what the Pakistanis had bought and where. This was in part a job for the Central Intelligence Agency, as well as for intelligence and security services throughout Western Europe. The picture that the spooks finally put together from all the bits and pieces floored even the most experienced analysts. While Washington had been pressuring Paris over French help for the reprocessing plant at Chashma, the Pakistanis had been buying an enormous variety of parts and equipment for the ultracentrifuge plant at Kahuta. According to one Washington insider, Mr Butt and his network had managed to get at least one of almost everything they would need while back in Pakistan the kindly Dr Khan was rapidly developing the capability to reproduce what could no longer be bought.

Pakistan's purchases challenged everything Washington had been trying to do through the London Clubs, especially as some governments were using the London Club guidelines as an excuse to sell to the Pakistanis. If a particular piece of equipment was not listed, these governments would permit their companies to export it, even if the bureaucrats and businessmen both knew that it was going to Kahuta. Quite naturally, the Americans expected everyone else to follow the spirit of the guidelines, even if the Americans themselves obeyed only the letter of the law.

In American eyes, the worst offenders were the Swiss, and in early 1979, Washington sent a strong diplomatic note to Bern.

The Americans were most concerned about two shipments—the high vacuum valves from VAT and the gassification and solidification unit from CORA Engineering. Both firms were keeping resident engineers in Pakistan, advising and providing post-sale servicing, and Washington feared that CORA would sell the Pakistanis a second gassification and solidification unit, which they still needed for Kahuta. The American note also mentioned other firms, including one, Sulzer Bros. that was supplying limited technology to the reprocessing side of the Pakistani programme.

In line with the general approach in Washington, the note to Bern carried with it the implied threat that the Americans might cut off shipments of enriched uranium to Switzerland, or delay permission for the Swiss to send any spent reactor fuel of American origin for reprocessing.

The note created great resentment in Bern, as did the threat. The Swiss had played by the rules, and now the Americans were trying to pillory them.

We got the story straight from the man now in charge, Dr Claude Zangger, the Deputy Director of the Federal Energy Office and the chairman of the international committee that had "brought down the trigger list" even before the London Club.

"In the spring of 1979 we made an inquiry," Dr Zangger told us. "We found that what was being imported was not on the list. It was on the

penitency. There was no legal basis for us to deny a license to export."

It was the old problem. The Swiss exports were not on the list, and not "specially designed" for the centrifuge enrichment process. "VAT" produces valves. They have a catalogue and the ready-made parts come off the shelf. CORA's unit was also "a conventional process. They are making this for many different uses. It's not part of the nuclear sensitive process."

Zangger disclosed that Bern sent this clarification to Washington promptly. He believed that Washington "accepted" it because he did not hear back from Washington immediately on his reply. American diplomats expressed to us their surprise that Zangger would draw a conclusion that Washington was "satisfied" with the Swiss response, and the Americans say they continued to press the Swiss for clarifications.

The Americans also pressured the Pakistanis directly. At this juncture, Pakistan was gaining fresh importance in Washington's strategic thinking. The Russians appeared to be winning new influence in neighbouring Afghanistan, where a coup in April 1978 had brought a Communist government to power, and with the weakening and fall of the Shah in Iran, the Pakistanis looked like the only available bastion in South Asia.

As a result, there was great pressure in Washington not to confront the Pakistanis too openly on their nuclear programme, but rather to wean them away from it with offers of aid. In October 1978, Washington resumed the economic aid that it had cut off the year before because of Chashma. In November, the Americans offered fifty Northrop F-5 fighters, equipped with air-to-ground missiles. And there were also offers of civilian nuclear aid and diplomatic support for Islamabad in its dealings with India.

The theory was that the Pakistanis were going nuclear primarily because of the weakness of Western guarantees to help defend them against the overwhelming military power of the Indians. But by 1979 the Pakistanis felt that they had already put extensive groundwork into their nuclear programme, and the Americans were offering far too little to make them give it up.

The Americans shortly changed their mind, deciding to pressure the Pakistanis by cutting off aid. In early March 1979, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher visited Islamabad to warn the Pakistanis of the consequences of continuing their nuclear quest. The following month, on April 6, Washington announced that it had cut off further economic subsidies to Pakistan. This amounted to a total of nearly \$30 million in the current year, and other \$45 million in the next.

"US laws require countries importing armaments components for atomic installations not subject to international security controls to be deprived of development funds," State Department spokesman Tom Reston announced in a formal statement. "Our information is that Pakistan is developing a centrifuge for the enrichment of uranium. In the long term this might give Pakistan a nuclear weapon capability. This would pose a difficult problem, and make for a grave situation. According to our laws, we have decided to cut back significantly on development aid to Pakistan."

The timing could hardly have been more dramatic. The Pakistani courts had predictably found former Prime Minister Bhutto guilty of conspiracy to murder, and in the face of appeals for clemency, by nearly every world leader from Jimmy Carter to Colonel Qaddafi, General Zia ul-Haq had ordered Bhutto hanged on April 4, only two days before.

The latter of the Islamic bomb, Bhutto died, and it was announced that his overthrow had been engineered by the American Central Intelligence Agency, and that of the take-over by General Zia had brought about

## WORLD

the stoppage of the Pakistani nuclear programme. Pakistan, he thought, would henceforth be defenceless before the Indian nuclear threat. As he wrote in his last political testament from prison, "What difference does my life make now when I can imagine eighty million of my countrymen standing under the nuclear cloud of a defenceless sky?"

Bhutto's assessment of Zia was inaccurate. Zia was continuing the nuclear bomb programme. Only two days after Bhutto died, largely for what he believed was the nuclear cause, the United States cut off aid to his executioner for pursuing the same Islamic bomb that Bhutto believed had been stopped with his own overthrow.

A spokesman for the Pakistan Foreign Ministry claimed the Americans had singled out Pakistan because they believed—wrongly, he insisted—that the Pakistanis might develop nuclear devices for the Muslim World to use against the Israelis.

Over the following months, Washington continued the pressure, appointing a special task force to consider new options for stopping the Pakistani nuclear programme or at least slowing it down. The task force was headed by Ambassador Gerard C. Smith, and it suggested a series of carrot-and-stick options that became public in midsummer.

One option was to try again to wean the Pakistanis away from nuclear weapons by beefing up their conventional defences, this time with the offer of the more advanced F-16 aircraft in place of the old F-5.

A second option was to use the stick of strict economic sanctions, restricting private American investment in Pakistan and blocking World Bank and other international loans.

A third option was the most surprising, and would have created great pressure on the Pakistanis—the use of covert operations, including a paramilitary attack to disable the Kahuta enrichment plant. When this possibility of covert action was published by *The New York Times* on August 12, 1979, the State Department immediately denied that it had ever been considered.

There is no evidence that Washington ever considered such an attack as anything more than an option, or that it was at all taken seriously. But the Pakistanis took the possibility very seriously indeed, and formally protested to the American Ambassador in Islamabad. At about this time they also installed French Crotale missiles at Kahuta to deter any surgical airstrikes by either the Americans, the Indians or the Israelis.

Probably more to the point, the Pakistanis also surrounded Kahuta and other key locations with plainclothes security men, and with the growing tension throughout the country, this led to a series of very nasty incidents.

In late July, the French Ambassador and one of his First Secretaries were driving along the road to Kahuta—just to see a nearby historical site, they later insisted. As they drove past the high walls of the enrichment plant, a mob surrounded the car and severely beat both men. The Pakistani Government later apologized. But the message was clear: foreigners should keep their distance from any of the country's nuclear facilities.

A few days later, in August, a young British journalist named Chris Sherwell tried to interview Abdul Qadeer Khan at his home in a garden suburb on the outskirts of Islamabad. A small group of men jumped Sherwell and beat him rather badly. The Pakistani Government then threatened to prosecute the journalist, and he was forced to leave the country.

In the words of an editor on Sherwell's newspaper, the *Financial Times*: "They did a very professional job on him."

Though unreported, we learned from the British Embassy in Islamabad that the son of a British diplomat was also attacked while passing in front of Khan's house on the way to a party, and there are stories of similar incidents that have never received any publicity.

In the meantime, Khan himself remained a man of mystery, unavailable to the Western press that had suddenly discovered one of the great espionage stories of the nuclear age. He was always guarded tightly by Pakistani security men.

Yet some of those who knew Khan best did manage to see him, and they reported that Dr Khan remained the same genial person he had always been.

"He's now the normal house father," recalled his old mentor, Professor Brabers, who visited him in Islamabad. "He likes to do the cooking and to work in the garden. He has tomatoes and even peanuts. He likes to take care of his wife and his two nice children."

But there were signs that Khan was beginning to grow bitter at his treatment in the hands of the Western media, where major stories had already appeared in *Der Spiegel* and the London weekly, *8 Days*. A hero in Pakistan, Dr Khan had become an archvillain in Europe, and he did not like that at all.

"Western journalism takes pride in false" and malicious reporting, especially when it covers the developing countries," he wrote in a fascinating and wholly unexpected letter to the German magazine *Der Spiegel*, as he tried to vindicate his actions to those who blackened his name—unjustly, he claimed. "The intensity is enhanced when it deals with Muslim countries."

"I want to question the bloody hotter-than-thou attitudes of the Americans and the British," he continued. "These bastards are God-appointed guardians of the world to stockpile hundreds of thousands of nuclear warheads and have the God-given authority of carrying out explosions every month. But if we start a modest programme, we are the Satans, the devils, and all the journalists consider it a crusade to publish fabricated and malicious stories."

Yet the facts are clear enough. The Pakistanis know that the goal of Western companies is to profit by the sale of their products. The marketplace does not ask them to analyse their customers' motives. Neither, in most cases, do their governments.

We soon discovered, in the course of our investigation, exactly what the Pakistanis had seen previously. The regulations and agreements that exist among Western countries to block the sale of "dangerous nuclear technology" can be easily circumvented. The system of safeguards and controls is hopelessly vulnerable, easily evaded, and badly defined—many of the parts for uranium-enrichment plants could be bought individually on the open market and the regulations would not apply at all.

Most important, the Pakistanis knew that the mouthings of the diplomats against nuclear proliferation were hollow. The regulations were inadequate, the list of banned or monitored items incomplete, and there was no serious, comprehensive policing effort to prevent violations of the nuclear regulations that did exist.

Whether inspired by Satan or Allah Himself, the Pakistanis' "modest" nuclear programme had advanced dramatically in the unexpected direction of uranium enrichment, and the West had done little to stop it. Partly, this was because of Dr Khan's own skilful endeavours in getting the plans and the supplier lists for the needed parts. And partly, we concluded, it was because the community of nations simply did not have a system to prevent nuclear proliferation. It lacked the concerted will, the attention to detail, and the power of enforcement that would make one work.

Dir.	Visie
Ag. no.	Sup. w. DRW/AT
Dossier	

# OPEN BERICHT

01-

zczc rr nlbuz  
 mmm sss dges drw drwat dgis plvdgis  
 advdgis plan dio dioov anpo ppss nlbuz  
 tot20  
 doa doaza  
 daz dazsz dazpp  
 isl 541

*chef DRW*  
*M. i. zonden oekolo van*  
*de meer aperte lengour*  
*(mdsraan dere ble) door*  
*de Amb. in een ingelonden*  
*brief moeten worden*

afkomstig : van islamabad  
 bestemd : voor min v bz  
 onderwerp strafvervolgung dr. a.q.khan  
 r m.b. 1054 van 011283

volgen enige passages uit en verkorte weergave van voorpagina-artikel in "the muslim" van 081283 met kop "dutch duplicity exposed in sham 'conviction'", dr. a.q khan case pakistan's response should be hard hitting", van hand van zekere ashraf hashmi.

*woortlogd.*

*11/12*

the government of pakistan is understood to have decided to take the case of dr. abdul qadeer khan to a superior dutch court as an appeal to the judgement of a lower court. sentencing the pakistani nuclear scientist in absentia on the most ridiculous and flimsiest charges of attempting to obtain some insignificant classified information from one of his old assistants in 1976-77 by writing a letter from pakistan. the law ministry is said to have fully studied the case and was in the process of engaging some lawyers to represent dr. khan s case in one of the superior courts in holland. the foreign office is also taking up the matter with the dutch government.

*chef DRW,*  
*Ik heb dit met*  
*DRW bespoken,*  
*die antwoord is*  
*met ontwerp -*  
*antwoord*  
*9/14/12*

het artikel citeert de opinie van 'legal experts' die de door dr. khan in zijn brief gevraagde informatie volslagen onbetekenend noemen gezien de duizenden hoogst ingewikkelde componenten en gesophisticeerde instrumenten die in een ultracentifuge machine verwerkt worden en die dan ook van mening zijn dat de nederlandse procureur-generaal "foolishly tried to paint a doomsday for the world if this insignificant information was made available to dr. khan. everybody who is anybody in centrifuge technology fully knows that information related to a single component is useless in itself. " bovendien kreeg dr. khan nooit antwoord op de brief die hij verzond "but the dutch judiciary woke up suddenly after six years of long slumber and convicted our most well-known and able nucleair scientist on these flimsy grounds of so called an attempted crime in a foreign country. the unprecedented haste and deliberate act to prosecute dr. khan is evident from the fact that he was not informed of the court proceedings no summons were served on him through the public prosecutor the dutch police and the dutch embassy in islamabad knew his address. thus no chance was given to him to defend himself."

OPEN BERICHT

Dir.	Visie
Ag. no.	
Dossier	

02-

hoewel de nederlandse rechter nog voor de zitting een telegram van khan ontving waarin dezetegen deze gang van zaken protesteerde besloot hij de zaak tegen khan voortgang te laten vinden en sloot hij de hele behandeling daarvan na een uur met een vonnis af 'in order to satisfy the guilty conscience of the dutch bureaucracy'

in het artikel wordt vervolgens beweerd dat de betoonde haast om khan te veroordelen alleen maar verklaard kan worden uit de behoefte van de nederlandse regering om tegenover het nederlandse volk, dat massaal demonstreert tegen de plaatsing van dodelijke amerikaanse kernwapens op nederlands grondgebied een gebaar te maken waaruit moet blijken dat men bijzonder waakzaam is. khan is tot zondebok gemaakt. "by convicting dr. khan one legal expert said, the judge and the dutch government wanted to play the good guy who punished a 'criminal' who tried to know about a non-significant piece of know-how. however if the dutch government he asked, was so hard on such a small matter how could it be a party to the 'spread of nuclear weapons'? a nice comedy for public consumption at dr. khan's cost."

in het vervolg van het artikel wordt betoogd dat de wet op grond waarvan khan veroordeeld is geen "legal value" heeft. "you can make any law as long as it applies to your own citizens and your own soil. you cannot thrust them on a foreign country or a foreigner in a foreign country" wat vooral gewraakt wordt is de inbreuk die de nederlandse rechter zou hebben gemaakt op de soevereiniteit van een onafhankelijke staat door een op pakistaans onderdaan in nederland de eigen nederlandse wet toe te passen. bovendien, zo herhalen de in het artikel aan het woord gelaten (ongenoemde) 'legal experts', is het schrijven van een brief (aan een nederlander in nederland) met een verzoek om inlichtingen geen misdaad. "you just ignore or refuse the request. no crime is done. if you give the information then you are committing a crime against your own country and are liable to prosecution according to your own law."

het laatste deel van het artikel bevat andermaal de bewering dat de vervolging en veroordeling van khan niet gericht is tegen een individuele pakistaan. "by convicting him the dutch and the west have convicted pakistan's nucleair programme and humiliated the nation's pride. the government should not remain idle as it was incumbent on it to respond strongly and in a hard-hitting manner to the judgement of a publicity-hungry judge of a small court ignorant of international code of conduct the public prosecutor lied to the judge, who being a layman not being able to comprehend the technicalities of these accusations accepted the stupid assertions made by the prosecutors."

in hoeverre op de aparte onjuistheden in het - u heden per koerier volledig toegezonden - artikel mijnerzijds dient gereageerd bijv. door een ingezonden brief aan "the muslim", moge ik aan uw beter inzicht overlaten, mede daar woordvoering over de zaak khan

# MINISTERIE VAN BUITENLANDSE ZAKEN

AFDELING VERBINDINGEN - 'S-GRAVENHAGE - LANGE HOUTSTRAAT 28

TELEX 31326

TEL.: 614941 - 2530 en 2922

## OPEN BERICHT

-03-

usver uitsluitend in den haag plaats vindt.

peyra

islamabad, 8 december 1983=pc=

-tvv 9 december 1983

Dir.	Visie
Ag. no.	
Dossier	

09 12 83 NLBUZ 043 ISL 723



Ministerie van Economische Zaken

Aar

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.

32 AJ.

8

na;

tie;

's-Gravenhage,  
Dir.-Gen./Hfd. Afd.  
Kenmerk  
Berkiesnummer (070)

26 januari 1984  
BA  
EZ/BA/0070/84  
796071

Onderwerp

Werkgroep Bos.

Ter kennisneming doe ik U hierbij fotocopieën toekomen van artikelen uit MUSLIM van 1 december 1983 en NUCLEAR FUEL van 16 januari 1984 welke de heer Bovens mij deed toekomen.

Het Hoofd van de afdeling  
Bijzondere Aangelegenheden  
Beveiligingsambtenaar,

(R.C. Ackx)

Adres:  
Bezuidenhoutseweg 30

Postadres:  
Postbus 20101  
2500 EC 's-Gravenhage

Telefoon  
(070) 79 89 11

Telegramadres  
ecza gv

Telex  
31099 ecza nl

## Dutch Government's travesty of justice

MUSLIM

1 Dec 83.

RECENTLY a curious case of "conviction" took place by a Dutch Court of Law. According to reports, a lower court of Holland has "convicted" Dr. Abdul Qadir Khan on the puerile and petty ground of writing a letter to a colleague seeking some innocuous information which, in any case, was not furnished. This letter was written to an old Dutch colleague by Dr. A.Q. Khan some 6 years ago and he has now been "convicted in absentia" for 4 years, on the preposterous charge of "attempting to steal nuclear secrets." This travesty of justice becomes more sharply evident, given the fact that in 1980 the Dutch Government itself appointed a committee regarding Dr. Abdul Qadir Khan which exonerated the Pakistani scientist of all "charges." Such being the case, the recently rediscovered interest of the Dutch Government in prosecuting Dr. Abdul Qadir Khan on charges which are baseless and for "crimes" that were never committed only means that they are seeking a whipping boy to cover up their own conduct in acquiescing to the unpopular stationing of American nuclear missiles in their own country. Additionally, it seems to be part of the inspired international campaign against Pakistan's legitimate quest for nuclear independence in which Dr. Abdul Qadir Khan's contribution is outstanding and praiseworthy.

Recently Dr. Abdul Qadir Khan filed an appeal in the High Court of Amsterdam against his sham "conviction". The issue is not that of the person of a patriotic Pakistani who has served his country very well, but rather that of Pakistan and its sovereign right to seek nuclear technology. The main issue in this context is that of jurisdiction since no law of any country extends to a foreign citizen who is living in his own country. The Dutch Government's contention is not tenable under international law, as it has no jurisdiction in the case of Dr. Abdul Qadir Khan, who is not resident in Holland nor is he a Dutch citizen. We would hope that the Dutch Government in keeping with the accepted norms of international law as well as morality, will not succumb to pressures from its western patrons and instead uphold the cause of justice which demands that it instruct its Attorney General to withdraw this case. Prosecution of Dr. Abdul Qadir Khan means the prosecution of Pakistan.

Legal aspects apart, what is appalling in this situation is the shameful duplicity and double-standards evident in this case. Since Pakistan is on the Western "hit list" because of its quest for nuclear independence, it and its leading nuclear scientist have to be maligne. But if Israel covertly develops its nuclear bomb at the Dimona Reactor by stealing nuclear secrets from an American facility in Pennsylvania, then of course that is different and it is allowed to go scot free! We would also expect that the Government of Pakistan will shed its silence on this issue and take an assertive and bold position in consonance with its national interest and in defence of its worthy citizen, Dr. Abdul Qadir Khan.



*Nuclear Fuel*  
*Jan. 16 '84*

ents were based on a 1966-1972 agreement between Kerr-McGee and Ranchers for calculating royalties that was not renewed, though still used until 1983. Ranchers first tried to renegotiate that agreement in 1978, Campbell said. The cash payment resulted from a recalculation of the 1978 to 1983 royalties using a new formula that will continue to be used in the future.

The new formula takes into account the actual selling price for U3O8 and the grade of ore. With respect to properties Ranchers owns and leases to Kerr-McGee, a sliding scale is to be used — the greater the value per ton of uranium ore, the greater the percentage of that value that will belong to Ranchers. With respect to properties in which Ranchers has only an overriding royalty, a fixed royalty of 2% of ore value has been set," Campbell said.

As a result of the settlement, Ranchers is in a very good cash position, according to Campbell. The company is looking into a number of new projects, he said, adding that several new mining properties are under evaluation.

**AFGHAN REBELS SAY SOVIETS MINE URANIUM IN AFGHANISTAN AND SHIP IT BACK HOME**

Rumors that the Soviet Union faces uranium shortfalls may be at least partially substantiated by a recent report that the Soviets are mining uranium in Afghanistan and shipping it back to their country.

The report comes from the Afghan Information & Documentation Center, a rebel news agency based in Peshawar, Pakistan, near the Afghan border. It says an Afghan defector, Mir Zaman Mohammad, claimed he worked with the Soviet geological team at the mining project in the Khwaja Rawash Mountains, as chief engineer in the geological survey of Afghanistan's Ministry of Mining & Industry. Mir Zaman said the Soviets have been working on the project for some time and began exporting uranium to the Soviet Union about six weeks ago, according to the report. Independent sources in Islamabad confirmed the presence of uranium in the Khwaja Rawash area as well as in other parts of northern and southern Afghanistan.

There have also been reports from Afghanistan of copper mining by the Soviets at the Ainak mines in Logar and establishment of a copper smelter near Kabul linked by a 17-mile road to the mines.

Soviet Embassy officials in Kabul told NuclearFuel about a month ago they were not aware of significant deposits of uranium in Afghanistan and that the Soviet Union was not involved in any such mining projects. However, U.S. diplomats in Kabul said they are convinced that the Soviets have had their eyes on Afghan uranium since the early 1960s, when, according to them, Russian geological survey teams, along with a few thousand military advisers, began prospecting for it not far from the capital city. The officials offered no evidence to support their claim.

The consensus among Western diplomats in Kabul is that the Soviets had their eyes on Afghan mineral resources for more than 15 years before their military invasion four years ago. There currently are 110,000-120,000 Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan, but Western military analysts figure that only 10,000-15,000 troops are needed to police the country, and that the remainder are involved in maneuvers, capital con-

struction projects like power plants and minerals mining. According to diplomats in Moscow, such projects help the military justify its continued expensive occupation of Afghanistan.

**PAKISTAN NAMES KAHUTA FACILITY FOR KHAN**

Pakistan has honored its well-known but controversial nuclear scientist, Abdul Qadeer Khan, by naming the nuclear facility at Kahuta after him, according to local newspaper reports. They said the facility, about 30 miles southeast of Islamabad, was named the Abdul Qadeer Research Laboratory. Convicted in absentia by a Dutch court for attempting to obtain classified enrichment technology (Nucleonics Week, 1 Dec '83, 5), Khan is believed to be the man who masterminded the Kahuta facility by allegedly importing various components for the plant through organizations or by promoting their indigenous production. Newspapers said President Zia ul-Haq decided to name the Kahuta facility after him in recognition of his services. Khan, meanwhile, is reported to have filed an appeal to the Dutch government through the Pakistan Embassy to exonerate him from the Dutch court conviction.

Locally, Khan is fighting a magazine's use of words like "spy" and "smuggler" to describe the Pakistani scientist who worked at the Almelo-based research laboratory in Holland from 1972 through 1976. On Abdul Qadeer Khan Research Laboratory stationery, Kahn told Qaumi Digest that he risked his life and those of his wife and children to serve his country. He said he achieved for Pakistan within seven years "at almost a penny" of what Britain, West Germany and Holland did in 20 years at a cost of almost \$2-billion.

The magazine said that Khan himself recruited people from the Army and other organizations to work in different capacities at the Kahuta project. It said the government has placed the services of two major generals, Akbar Khan and Anis Nawab, at Khan's disposal.

**THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE NUCLEAR FUELS CORP. OF SOUTH AFRICA**

passed from Dennis Etheredge to Anglovaal's executive director W.W. Malan. Etheredge, who was executive director of Anglo American and chairman of its gold and uranium division, retired at the end of last year. Malan previously was president of the South African Chamber of Mines and remains on the chamber's executive committee, council and gold producers' committee. Etheredge also was a chamber president and current member of the executive committee and council. His position with Anglo's gold and uranium division was taken by E.P. Gush, previously president, chairman and chief executive officer of the Toronto-based Hudson Bay Mining & Smelting Co.

**THE LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO. IS TRYING TO TRADE**

122,407 FY-84 swu and has one proposal on the table that it is "very optimistic about," an informed source says. The utility also is watching DOE to see what it finally produces in the way of a new enrichment contract so any deal might be put off until that happens, the source adds. In the meantime, the utility has solicited bids for delivery of 400,000 lbs of U3O8 this spring to supplement inventory feed for its FY-84 delivery to DOE but is hoping it won't have to make the purchase. That will depend on whether it can unload the swu.



Ministerie van Economische Zaken

Aan :

- 1. m:
- 2. d:
- 3. m:
- 4. d:
- 5. d:
- 6. m:
- 7. m:
- 8. m:

7  
A5

dos. 65

ie;

30 januari 1984  
 BA  
 EZ/BA/0081/84  
 796071

Werkgroep Bos.

Op verzoek van de voorzitter doe ik U hierbij, wellicht ten  
 overvloede, foto-copieën van artikelen uit de N.R.C. van  
 27.01.1984 toekomen.

Het Hoofd van de afdeling  
 Bijzondere Aangelegenheden  
 Beveiligingsambtenaar,

(R.C. Ackx)

27 JAN. 1984

## Nucleair centrum Pakistan krijgt naam atoomspion

Door een onzer redacteuren

ROTTERDAM, 27 jan. — Het nucleaire centrum in Kahuta, waar de Pakistaanse regering bezig is een ultracentrifugefabriek voor het verrijken van uranium te bouwen, is herdoopt in Abdel-Quader-Khanlaboratorium. Daarmee heeft president Zia ul-Haq zijn erkentelijkheid willen betuigen aan dr. Khan.

Deze Pakistaanse metallurg heeft in de jaren '70 in het laboratorium voor fysisch-dynamisch onderzoek in Amsterdam en in de ultracentrifugefabriek in Almelo ten onrechte toegang gehad tot de geheime procédés om uranium door centrifugeren te verrijken. De sterke verdenking bestaat dat hij zich in die periode blauwdrukken van de procédés heeft toegeëigend, omdat de centrifugefabriek die op het ogenblik in Kahuta verrijst een getrouw evenbeeld is van die in Almelo.

Op 14 november 1983 heeft de rechtbank in Amsterdam Khan bij verstek wegens een poging tot spionage veroordeeld tot vier jaar gevangenisstraf. Andere punten van de tenlastelegging achtte de rechtbank niet bewezen. Khan heeft tegen dit vonnis beroep aangekend. Naar verwachting zal de zaak omstreeks april voor het Amsterdamse hof dienen.

### IN DE MARGE

#### Provocerend

De regering heeft de diefstal van het geheime ultracentrifugeprocédé door de Pakistaanse metallurg Khan zoveel mogelijk *low key* willen spelen. Ze had daarvoor goede redenen. Ten eerste is Pakistan een concentratieland en ontvangt 48 miljoen gulden ontwikkelingshulp per jaar. Bovendien is president Zia ul-Haq bij een goede verstandhouding wellicht nog af te houden van zijn omineuze plan om — met behulp van de gestolen gegevens — een kernwapen aan te maken. Tenslotte ligt Pakistan als buurland van Afghanistan in een politiek brisante regio waar voor het Westen grote belangen op het spel staan.

Wie nu had verwacht dat de regering in Islamabad voor deze diplomatieke houding erkentelijk zou zijn en van haar kant de "zaak-Khan" zo tactvol mogelijk met de mantel der liefde zou bedekken komt bedrogen

uit. Niet alleen heeft Khan, na in november vorig jaar bij verstek tot 4 jaar gevangenisstraf te zijn veroordeeld, daartegen beroep aangetekend. Maar ook heeft Zia ul-Haq de gotspe om de gloednieuwe ultracentrifugefabriek in Kahuta — een exacte replica van die in Almelo — in het "Abdel-Quader-Khanlaboratorium" om te dopen.

Een klap in het gezicht van het nateve, goedgevolige Nederland. Een atoomspion vervult een opdracht en wordt voor zijn huzarenstukje nog openlijk gehuldigd ook. Provocerender kan het niet.

Met onze miljoenenhulp gaan we intussen door alsof er niets aan de hand is. Ontwikkelingshulp mag immers niet worden gekoppeld aan politieke voorwaarden?

Mag Pakistan wel onder onze ogen, met onze technologie en ons geld een atoombom maken?  
A.F.E.S.

35  
MINISTERIE VAN BUITENLANDSE ZAKEN

AFDELING VERBINDINGEN - 'S-GRAVENHAGE - LANGE HOUTSTRAAT 28

TELEX 31326 en  
TEL.: 614941 - 2530 en 2922

Dir.	✓	Visie	✓
Ag. no.	40216		DRW
Dossier			

# OPEN BERICHT

-01-

zczc rr nlbuz  
 mmm rrr ttt sss dgpz aapp dges  
 dgis plvdgis advdgis plan amad dvl dvl dp  
 dvlos dvlbl dio dioafdn eecc ccmm deu  
 deubur dwh dwhnc dav jura aod ados  
 anpo ppss aacc nlbuz autodis cop60  
 doa doabur  
 .isl 645

**DOSSIERKOPIE**

afkomstig van: amb. islamabad  
bestemd voor :min. van buitenl. zaken

onderwerp: interview dr. a.q. khan

n.a.v. door dr a.q. khan gemaakte opmerkingen in een recent interview over het pak. vermogen om een kernwapen te maken indien de pakistaanse regering daartoe de (politieke) beslissing zou nemen, werd president zia bij zijn vertrek naar moskou op 13 dezer door journalisten zijn commentaar gevraagd.

het hierop betrekking hebbende ppi-bericht uit de pak. times van heden luidt als volgt:

quo

the president, gen. mohammad zia-ul-haq today emphatically said that pakistan did not desire to make atom bomb and wanted to acquire nuclear technology for peaceful use for the generation of power.

talking to newsmen before his departure for moscow, the president took notice of the reported interview of dr. abdul qadeer khan, an eminent nuclear scientist of pakistan, and said that his interview was publicised both out of proportion and out of context, in the foreign countries.

he appealed to the press not to play up such statements out of proportion and not undermine the security and stability of the country.

he said no useful purpose will be served by publishing such sensational stories for the sake of selling newspapers.

he said it was pakistan's policy not to make atom bomb to achieve any objective, but to use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes. he hoped that his statement will clarify the whole issue.

unquo

tekst van het uit het urdu vertaalde interview met dr. khan u toegaat per e.v. koerier.

peyra

islamabad, 14 februari 1984 =fn=

\*\*\*

15 02 84 NLBUZ 300 ISL 860

ONTOEGEGEVEN



# PAKISTAN NEWS

WIKI/PAI

Vol.

February 14, 1984 No.

## PRESS RELEASE

Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, a Pakistani Nuclear Scientist said in Islamabad on Monday that his recent interview to an Urdu daily of Pakistan was being deliberately misinterpreted for reasons not known to him. Dr. Khan reiterated that as per government policy, Pakistan is engaged in a very limited research and development programme solely for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. He said, "any other interpretation of my statement would be incorrect".

2. President Zia ul Haq in reply to a question by a newsman at Islamabad airport before his departure for Moscow on Monday said, "in the last few days, the Pakistani Press has published statements of Dr. A.Q. Khan with gusto and embellishments. In my view the publication of interviews, which have been distorted, serves no useful purpose. Pakistan's stand on this point has been very clear. Pakistan's nuclear programme is geared to the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only. To acquire technology is our right but I would like to state categorically that we would use this technology only for peaceful purposes. It will not be used for any other purposes. Pakistan had no intention to produce a nuclear bomb".

**Zia Holds News Conference on Return From Moscow**  
*BK151744 Karachi Domestic Service in English 1700 GMT*  
 15 Feb 84

[Text] President Mohammad Ziaul Haq has hoped that Pakistan-Soviet relations will continue to develop under Mr Konstantin Chernenko, the new Soviet leader, and there will be further progress toward a political solution of the Afghanistan problem through indirect negotiations under the UN auspices. The president was addressing a news conference on his return to Islamabad tonight from Moscow after attending the funeral of Mr Andropov.

The president said during the short tenure of the late Soviet leader, Mr Andropov, bilateral relations between Pakistan and the Soviet Union progressed in various spheres, particularly in the economic fields. We expect that not only will these relations find greater dimensions, but there would be progress on the solution of the Afghanistan problem, and Mr Chernenko would take up the thread from where it was left by his predecessor, Mr Yuriy Andropov.

The president said because of Mr Chernenko's preoccupations and his brief stay in the Soviet capital, he could not have the opportunity to meet with the new Soviet leader separately. However, during the brief meeting with Mr Chernenko, along with the other world leaders attending the funeral, he conveyed to him our sentiments and good wishes.

Paying rich tributes to the late Soviet president, Mr Yuriy Andropov, President Mohammad Ziaul Haq said he was a great leader with remarkable farsightedness. It was unfortunate that he could not live longer to serve his country. He said it is our hope that the new Soviet leadership will fulfill the expectations of the Soviet people and work for the progress of the country.

Replying to a question, the president said Pakistan has approached the question of Afghanistan not as an individual, but as a member of the Organization of Islamic Conference which jointly decided to settle this problem, and we are bound by the decisions of the ICO. He said there is no question of having direct talks with the Kabul regime, although there have been some suggestions in the past that Pakistan should negotiate directly with the Kabul regime. Details of the news conference are still coming in.

**Admits Uranium Enrichment Capability**  
*BK160640 Karachi Domestic Service in Urdu 0200 GMT*  
 16 Feb 84

[Excerpts] President Mohammad Ziaul Haq has expressed the hope that Pakistani-Soviet relations will continue to develop under the new Soviet leader, Mr Konstantin Chernenko, and there will be further progress toward a political solution of the Afghan issue through indirect negotiations under UN auspices. The president was addressing a news conference on his return to Islamabad from Moscow last night after attending the funeral of Mr Andropov.

Asked whether in his meeting with Cuban leader Fidel Castro he had discussed the Afghanistan issue and the use of Mr Castro's good offices to resolve this issue, the president said: We can expect that Castro may use his good offices, but we have been trying to resolve this issue politically and we have every hope that we will succeed. We also hope that we will have the support of the Soviet Union in this connection.

The president commended the role of Soviet Ambassador Smirnov, who was present at the news conference, in the promotion of Pakistani-Soviet relations. He said the Pakistani Embassy's role in this connection is equally commendable.

The president said that during his stay in Moscow, he exchanged views with U.S. Vice President George Bush, British Prime Minister Thatcher, PLO chief Yasir 'Arafat, and Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau on bilateral matters. He said these discussions will have a good impact on relations with these countries. In answer to a question, the president said Pakistan enjoys good relations with Canada and Canada has given valuable assistance to us.

Replying to another question, the president said that Pakistan has acquired a very modest capability to enrich uranium, but he reiterated that Pakistan has no purpose other than peaceful in acquiring nuclear technology.

The president told a questioner that the government has always kept the doors of political negotiations open. We have had talks and are always read to talk with those who believe in the country's stability and uphold its ideology. He said that he and his colleagues were keen to ensure political stability and hold elections in the country to bring about a political leadership. He said he had already presented a political program and would abide by it.

**Scientist Explains Nuclear Program, Research**  
*GF131730 Lahore NAWA-E WAQT in Urdu 10 Feb 84*  
 magazine supplement

["Exclusive" interview with Dr Abdul Qadir Khan by NAWA-E WAQT correspondent in Lahore on 9 February]

[Text] Question: You are the first Pakistani scientist to challenge the Western experts' monopoly on the enrichment of uranium. Is it because of this challenge that the people concerned in the West and their media have begun to slander you? Can you specify what country was working behind the scenes in this regard and still is despite the fact that the Netherlands Government granted you permission to work at the (Almelo) center after complete checks and appointed you a special adviser?

Abdul Qadir Khan: In fact, it was not only a challenge but it has destroyed the monopoly forever. By the grace of God, Pakistan is now among the few countries in the world that can efficiently enrich uranium. Whenever the Western countries think about us, they just imagine a few horse- and donkey-drawn carts. They could never envisage that a developing country like Pakistan would ever actually break the monopoly forever within a few years. The examples of India and Switzerland are before us. They were blackmailed by the imposition of restrictions on

the enrichment of uranium and political advantages were reaped. As you know, this work is extremely difficult and its importance is paramount in the nuclear field. Progressive and affluent countries such as the Netherlands, Great Britain, and West Germany have spent the astronomical sum of \$2 billion and have worked 20 years to set up a pilot plant through their joint efforts at (Almelo) in the Netherlands.

Similarly, a progressive country like Japan spent \$650 million and managed to set up a small plant in 10 years. The United States is now setting up a centrifuge plant at Portsmouth, Ohio at a cost of \$10 billion which will go into partial operation by 1988.

In light of the above facts, the Western countries could not even imagine that a poor and backward country like Pakistan could end this monopoly in so short a time. As soon as they realized that Pakistan had shattered their dreams, they fell on Pakistan and on me like hungry wolves and showered us with all the pejorative and derogatory terms in the world. Just consider for a moment the fact that they could not tolerate a Muslim country becoming their equal in such an important field. Despite the president's repeated assurances that our nuclear program is for peaceful purposes only and for the production of electricity, these countries incited their media against Pakistan and myself.

Question: France has not honored its agreement to provide a reprocessing plant to Pakistan. Will Pakistan be able to successfully continue in the field of nuclear technology? When will Pakistan be able to utilize the nuclear power from the (Kahorh) plant at which work is being conducted for peaceful purposes? Pakistan now enjoys an outstanding position in the nuclear field and the Pakistani Government as well as the Pakistani people think Pakistan should be equal to other advanced countries in the use of nuclear power for peaceful purposes. Can you specify how long it will before the wish of the Pakistani people materializes?

Abdul Qadir Khan: As to the implementation of the agreement to provide a reprocessing plant, the attitude of the anti-Islamic Western countries, which they have against all developing countries in general, and the Muslim countries in particular is responsible, that is, no advanced technology should fall into our hands so that we will always remain at their mercy. They are all the same about this policy. We have no direct concern about the reprocessing plant and work is continuing under the supervision of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission [PAEC]. We are certain that if they work wholeheartedly and if the government provides the desired facilities, they will be able to do this work easily. You are deluding yourself if you think that the (Kahorh) plant is operating to enrich uranium. This uranium is being used to manufacture fuel for light water reactors. The Pakistani Government is trying to purchase a 900-megawatt reactor and negotiations are continuing with many countries for this purpose. It requires at least 10 years to obtain, install, and operate such a reactor. Because of this, we have at least 10 years to provide the requirements of our nuclear reactor. We are positive that when it begins operation, we will be able to provide it with fuel from our (Kahorh) plant. In this way, we will save ourselves the problems and helplessness that India is facing at present and we will also save on foreign exchange. The advantages of the work we are doing at the moment will become evident in a few years.

Question: As you well know, the Western press, led by U.S. newspapers, continue to drop hints about "an Islamic bomb." It is also a fact that Israeli capitalists are working behind the scenes. The government has said this is baseless. But despite these reassurances, sporadic propaganda continues. Would you like to comment on the reasons for this?

Abdul Qadir Khan: The "Islamic bomb" is a figment of the Zionist mind and this has been used with full force by the anti-Islamic Western countries. You must know that films have been made on the topic and books have been published, which are brimming with lies. All the Western countries are involved in this. Some to a greater and some to a lesser extent, but they all join the martyrs' camp by putting a little blood on their fingers. [Urdu proverb] I think that there is no other subject in the world about which so many lies have been told as have the falsehoods which have been piled on us in this respect. The fact is, when we return from Western countries after completing studies there, we are amazed at the fact that such educated and cultured persons can stoop to such low acts. This persistent propaganda is aimed at creating fear in people and commercial organizations in Western countries so that if they sell anything to Pakistan it will appear again in the form of an Islamic bomb; therefore, they must not sell anything to Pakistan. They have been successful in this mischief-mongering to some extent and have imposed restrictions on the export of the most minor products.

By the grace of God, we are not dependent on them and we can manufacture such things in Pakistan ourselves according to our needs. In this regard, we must congratulate the scientists of the (Kahorh) plant and its engineers who have made Pakistan self-sufficient in this important job.

Question: Many countries, especially Canada and other European countries, are not nuclear powers. They have not manufactured bombs but they are far advanced in nuclear energy. How long will it take Pakistan to achieve this position? The above-mentioned countries provide nuclear technology to other countries and cooperate in supplying facilities to others, among which India heads the list. India conducted its first nuclear test in 1974 and, reportedly, it can do it again anytime. It has also acquired the ability to manufacture many atom bombs every year. But when Pakistan talks of peaceful uses of nuclear energy the same countries quickly begin propaganda against Pakistan. What is the reason for this contradictory behavior?

Abdul Qadir Khan: As I said before, all the Western countries including Israel are not only Pakistan's enemies but also enemies of Islam. If some other Muslim country had accomplished the same thing, the same venomous and false propaganda would have been conducted against it as well. The examples of Iraq and Libya are before you. Even though these countries are not capable of manufacturing an atom bomb for a long time yet Western media sources are conducting a violent propaganda campaign against them. In fact, the Iraqi officer in charge of Iraq's nuclear program, Dr Yahya (al-Mashhad), was killed ruthlessly in broad daylight in the famous Hotel Meridien in Paris while Iraq's nuclear reactor, which was being completed under supervision by an international body, was also destroyed.

All this is part of the crusades which the Christians and Jews had initiated against the Muslims 1000 years ago. Islam was the only religion which uprooted their culture and civilization and they have not forgotten it even today. The second reason is that all countries are aware that Muslims believe in monotheism and despite political disunity, they share each other's hardships. They are afraid that if Pakistan makes obvious progress in this field, then the whole Islamic world will stand to benefit. There is no such danger from India. You know that Iraq, Libya, and Iran had increased ties with India in the hope that India would assist them in nuclear technology but this was not the case and they were sorely disappointed. This is the reason why Western countries ignore India's nuclear program and its results and are after us.

**Question:** How can you compare Pakistan and India in the field of nuclear energy? India is far ahead of us. Can we catch up with India? How far ahead is India?

**Abdul Qadir Khan:** India was far ahead of us in the nuclear field. In fact, its nuclear program was based from the very beginning on sound foundations. The late Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru was at the head of this program and he used to take a lot of personal interest in it. Unfortunately, this did not happen in our country. When Dr Usmani, a very competent nuclear scientist with a PhD in nuclear science, came, he set the nuclear program on a correct course. The nuclear powerplant at Nilor, "Pintech," and the Karachi powerplant "Kanupp," are the results of his efforts. He also got our scientists and engineers trained in the Western countries on very high and proper bases, and thus the base of our nuclear program was laid at a much later date than that of India. Now the Atomic Energy Commission staff is doing its best to fill the vacuum. As far as we are concerned, by the grace of God, we have left India far behind in enriching uranium and we are confident that India has so far made no headway in this respect. Such a big success in such a short time is the result of the personal interest and efforts of President General Mohammad Ziaul Haq. He not only encouraged our engineers and scientists, he also provided them with all the facilities which became the basis for this difficult task. I and my colleague are proud that we have placed Pakistan in a very enviable position in this field in the international level. If similar hard work is done in other fields with the same interest, then, God willing, we will reach the level of India in a very short time.

**Question:** Huge expenditure is needed in carrying out nuclear programs. Does Pakistan have enough financial resources to make satisfactory progress in this field and then use it in making up the shortfall in electric power, which we are facing now?

**Abdul Qadir Khan:** You are absolutely right that this job needs a huge amount of money. Unfortunately, our country has limited resources and it is on this account that we are dealing with our program in a gradual way. If we did not have this handicap we could have done this a long time ago and would have caught up with India. In any case, whatever has been done is praiseworthy, and the laurels of these achievements go to the present regime. I must make one thing absolutely clear: contrary to the mischievous foreign propaganda, no foreign country has given financial or technical aid to us in this field. Whatever achievement we have secured has been done by tightening our own belts. This

achievement is the result of the untiring and selfless efforts of our scientists and engineers. Our technicians are not far behind foreign experts in any field. I am sure that, God willing, we will be able to make use of the atomic power within a few years. The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission is doing all it can in this field and is busy in this regard. Most certainly, it will get satisfactory results in this field and will meet the electricity needs of the general public. As far as the supply of enriched uranium is concerned, we will supply the Atomic Energy Commission, God willing, with as much as it needs.

**Question:** We hear that the heavy water supply is very important in obtaining nuclear power, but nobody has mentioned anything about heavy water in Pakistan. Will this be imported or will some other process be used, which will not require heavy water? Has India set up four new heavy water factories?

**Abdul Qadir Khan:** Only the Karachi electric powerplant (Kanupp) needs heavy water and the Atomic Energy Commission keeps making necessary arrangements for this. As far as installation of a new reactor is concerned, the government has decided to use a light water reactor. No heavy water will be required by this reactor. As far as I think, as soon as the Kanupp runs its full life, we won't need heavy water at all. Even if we do need heavy water in the future, the scientists and other engineers will arrange for its supply.

**Question:** We have raw uranium in Pakistan. Is it processed in Pakistan or will we have to import processed uranium from abroad?

**Abdul Qadir Khan:** We have ample reserves of raw uranium in Pakistan and these are processed under the supervision of Atomic Energy Commission. The requirements of the Kahuta plant are met from the local supply.

**Question:** Pakistan is not much advanced in other sectors of science, particularly metallurgy and electronics. Are the computers required for the nuclear energy imported from abroad and are these things readily available in the world?

**Abdul Qadir Khan:** It is true that Pakistan is far behind in the field of electronics and metallurgy compared to the developed countries, but the conditions are not so hopeless that we could not make do with what we have. Although you do not see progress in offices and in the streets on the scale you see in the foreign developed countries, we are sufficiently expert in the items which we need for our jobs and, with the grace of God, our work is going ahead in a completely satisfactory manner and we are self-sufficient in several related branches. Since our needs are not limited, therefore, we have often to import items from abroad. Although Western countries do all they can to put obstacles in our way, somehow or other we do succeed in getting the required items. In the field of metallurgy, I have made enough progress on the international field and, in other sectors, our scientists and engineers have made considerable progress.

**Question:** In what sectors can nuclear energy be used, keeping in mind the circumstances which prevail in Pakistan?



Abdul Qadir Khan: As you know, the Atomic Energy Commission is using nuclear power in many sectors, for example, in electric power production, agriculture, medicine, medical treatment, and several other things. This circle may grow as the time passes.

Question: Will Pakistan be able to build a fast-breed reactor so that it can install its own electric power stations and, if so, how long will this take?

Abdul Qadir Khan: It is a very complicated technology; it needs much time, capital, and investment. Surely, the fast-breed reactor is considered to be the reactor of the future. If the Government of Pakistan makes a decision in this respect in time, then it would be a big challenge for Pakistani scientists and engineers and it is hoped that Pakistani scientists and engineers will accept this challenge. You must know that after 20 years of joint efforts, France and India have now been able to install an experimental reactor in India. Western countries also have achieved only a limited success in this field.

Question: American press, like *NEWSWEEK*, *TIME*, *THE NEW YORK TIMES*, *THE WASHINGTON POST*, and the Indian paper *PATRIOT* have reported that Pakistan has tested a nuclear device. Although this report has been contradicted, would you like to say why these reports were published?

Abdul Qadir Khan: This is a press war and they have better resources in this respect than we have. But, in fact, behind these reports lie the usual hostility toward Islam. By publishing such false and mischievous reports, these people want to frighten the general public and the commercial interests. This is done so that by putting them under pressure, they will not sell any important instruments or technical equipment to Pakistan. You should give a crushing reply to such baseless propaganda.

Question: Several countries, including the United States, are against Pakistan's atomic program. The Soviet ambassador recently said in an interview that Pakistan need not follow its atomic program and that the Soviet Union is ready to supply aid to Pakistan in connection with the solar energy, which will meet Pakistan's energy shortfall. What is the motive behind persuading Pakistan not to follow its atomic program?

Abdul Qadir Khan: As a matter of their basic principle, all the developed countries are against the developing countries making any headway toward higher technology. The reason is obvious. They want to keep their markets in shape and they want to keep others in need of them. In this respect, the reasoning of both the Soviet Union and the United States is the same. As far as atomic energy is concerned, much progress has been made in this field in the last few years and it is for this reason that developing countries are keen on having this source of energy. On the other hand, solar energy is also getting through its preliminary stages. Much time and capital are required to make it meet public energy needs. As far as the question of giving up our atomic energy program and obtaining solar energy without any cost is concerned, it reminds me of the spontaneous answer which Dr Usmani gave to an American representative. The question was: Why does Pakistan exert so much effort and spend so much money on wheat crops? We are ready to meet all your wheat

needs under the PL-48 program. Dr Usmani's answer was: "If burials were free, would all Americans be prepared to commit suicide?" Thus, it is obvious that we cannot give up our atomic research program.

Question: Surely, while working in foreign countries, you must have felt the need to serve your own country. Would you like to state whether you ever decided to act on this feeling?

Abdul Qadir Khan: You should know that every Pakistani who is in a foreign country for higher studies always thinks of returning to Pakistan to serve his own country and to make Pakistan benefit from his attainments and experiences.

When I left for Europe, I made up my mind that after studies I would return to Pakistan and would work for Pakistan's prosperity and welfare to the best of my abilities. After completing my higher studies, I remained in wait for a suitable opportunity to return to Pakistan. When I returned to Pakistan toward the end of 1975, I found that the ground was fertile for my services. I then gave up my idea to return to Europe. What happened after that is no secret to you.

Question: In your absence you were accused in The Netherlands of stealing some atomic secrets. An investigating committee was set up in this connect on pressure from Israel and the judgment delivered against you was 4 years imprisonment. Would you like to say something about this?

Abdul Qadir Khan: Mr Warsi, *NAWA-E WAQT*, and other newspapers and magazines of Pakistan have thrown sufficient light on the various aspects of my case. To begin with, I must thank *NAWA-E WAQT*, other newspapers and magazines, and the correspondents, who all strongly protested against this judgment. These protests brought positive results and gave moral strength to my colleagues and to my family members that the Netherlands Government had done much injustice to me by resorting to courts of law. I might add here that the Government of Pakistan filed an appeal against this unjust judgment on instructions from the respected president of Pakistan. Our ambassador in The Netherlands, Dr Khurshid Haider, who is a very competent diplomat, is personally looking after this case. In addition, the Pakistan Ministry of Law is going through this case from every point of view to be able to advise our lawyer in The Netherlands.

All these charges and court cases were imposed at the insistence of Zionists and Western anti-Islam elements. Under pressure from Israel, the Government of The Netherlands had set up a parliamentary committee in 1980 to go into this case. Its decision was that neither I nor anybody else in company with me had done any spying or had stolen any secrets and that nothing was handed over by me or by my colleague to any person or any government. However, this committee said that Pakistan had gained much capability in enriching uranium through my experience and abilities and that the Government of Pakistan has made a considerable saving of expenditure in this respect. It is quite contrary to all the canons of law to file a case against me after 4 years and also without giving me any facility to defend myself. Surely, the anti-Pakistan and anti-Islam elements had a hand in it. Moreover, all this was done when there was a great hue and cry in

Western Europe about the deployment of American nuclear warhead missiles and the Government of The Netherlands itself was engaged in efforts to have these missiles deployed in The Netherlands. To file a case against me, the Government of The Netherlands wanted to give an impression to its own people that it was totally against the spread of nuclear arms and that anybody who writes even a harmless letter to it — which may not even have been answered — can be sentenced to 4 years imprisonment by the government. In fact, this drama was staged in a futile effort to mislead the public. I am sure that the Supreme Court of The Netherlands, where the appeal has been filed, will invalidate the judgment of the lower court against me. Thus, it will compensate me for the injustice done to me.

The fact is that when this case was brought to the notice of lawyers of other European countries, they expressed surprise and said that no such injustice had ever been done in their own countries. They said that no case had ever been filed in their country in which a trial was held and a judgment of imprisonment delivered without giving the defendant an opportunity to defend himself. You know that I had sent three cables to the judge trying the case when I heard on 11 November 1983 through the press about this case. These cables, according to the prosecution, had reached there on 11 and 12 November respectively. Even then they hurried up the case and announced a judgment on 14 November. All these things are totally against the demands of justice.

Question: Doctor, the details published in Pakistani papers and periodicals about the filing of the case in the courts of The Netherlands and the reaction thereon clearly prove that the Kahuta project had no connection with the Atomic Energy Commission. What was the object of the Atomic Energy Commission in setting up a new scheme under the supervision of the government in connection with this project?

Abdul Qadir Khan: You know that if more air is pumped into a tube than it can absorb, it will burst and its usefulness will be turned into its uselessness.

Any scheme which is enlarged more than necessary loses its usefulness and all efforts made toward this end are wasted in resolving administrative difficulties. Problems of the people grow. There are so many huge departments which are not working according to their strength. If these are divided into several smaller departments then most certainly their output will grow. The Atomic Energy Commission is a very big organization. I am not sure, but I think 6,000 scientists and engineers are working in this organization. Its activities extend from atomic electrical power to medical and agricultural fields. A news report says that even a cure for infertility in women is being dealt with in this commission.

Enrichment of uranium is a highly complicated and difficult job. This needs revolutionary steps. We needed independence in our tasks. The government took an entirely wise step and allowed this scheme to work independently. The president and the minister of finance were very farsighted and kind and they allowed us to work independently. I am proud to say that I and my colleagues came up to their expectations. There was no other reason to let this scheme work independently except to guarantee its success.

The president and the government have repeatedly assured us that this program was meant for peaceful purposes only. We have worked round the clock to give Pakistan an enviable position in this field. In addition to our own scientists and the engineers, the Army engineers have also done a wonderful job in this respect. Shoulder to shoulder with their civilian colleagues, the Army engineers have done an admirable job in the electrical, electronic, and mechanical engineering aspects and they have earned praise from everybody. The Air Force engineers have also set an example in this field. Lastly, I would say that without the encouragement and guidance of President Gen Muhammad Ziaul Haq and Finance Minister Ghulam Ishaq Khan, this work would not have been finished. They encouraged us at every step and provided us with every facility.

Question: A number of projects have been taken up with great enthusiasm, but as time passes their completion seems to be coming to a sad end. The Kahuta project is the only project which has been praised even by our enemies. This project has placed Pakistan on a very admirable stage in the international atomic field. Could you give us an idea about the reasons for its praiseworthy success?

Abdul Qadir Khan: As regards other projects, only the officials responsible for those projects can throw light on them. As far as we are concerned, I and my colleagues decided that we would complete this project even at the cost of our lives. We have never cared for the restrictions placed on us by anti-Pakistan foreign countries. We have never complained to the government or to anybody else that such and such a country has stopped our equipment or has delayed its delivery. By working round the clock, and with the grace of God Almighty, we have achieved so much progress that we now can manufacture everything we need. We can now manufacture the most difficult pieces of equipment which we need.

Laurels for all this go to my colleagues. By working 12 to 13 hours a day and even working on holidays, they have made Pakistan self-sufficient in this most important field. If you knew my daily commitments, then you must have known that I am never able to leave for home before 1930 or 2000. The same is the case with my colleagues. They feel proud of their work. Our engineers and scientists are no less competent than the scientists and the engineers of other countries. They only need to be told their priorities. My colleagues have never doubted my good intentions nor have I had any doubts on their intentions.

Secondly, I have full confidence in them. I am working on an democratic basis and have given them full authority to select their colleagues and methods of work. I am very fortunate that I have had an opportunity to work with such patriotic Pakistanis. Mr Winston Churchill visited Egypt during World War II. He addressed the 8th Army Division and said: If anybody asks you what role you played during World War II, all you need to say is that you fought with the 8th Army. For me also, it is matter of great pride that I had an opportunity to work on the Kahuta project along with the most able and patriotic Pakistanis. It is essential for the success of any project that we should know the goal of our job. If you work on a PhD thesis and you say at the start that you have to perform this task and solve this difficulty, then you have already accomplished 50 percent of the task. The

remaining 50 percent then would not be difficult. A famous British author, G.K. Chesterton, has said in most clear words: "It is not that they cannot see the solution, it is that they cannot see the problem." The same weakness is common in Pakistan. There are a number of organizations and schemes, but their directors have failed to point out their goal and to accomplish their assigned task.

Question: You have spent more than 7 years working here but I have never seen you in any conference or meeting. Is there any specific reason for this?

Abdul Qadir Khan: Finance Minister Ghulam Ishaq Khan once said that there should be a conference on conferences because it was essential to find out the feasibility of holding conferences. If you are engaged in your work faithfully and sincerely for about 7 to 8 hours a day, then how can you find time to participate in conferences with a plate-size label on your chest? I consider conferences a means of propaganda for those who use them to advertise themselves after they have failed in the tasks allotted to them. In our project, meetings and conferences have disappeared. I daily tour my department and all talk concerns the work itself. We all, the directors, take our lunch together at one place. If there is any important point, we discuss it there and then and find a way to solve it. This method of work has proven very satisfactory and we have not wasted our time in any way. At the national level also, this method of work would prove most effective and there would be no need to hold conferences. The science and technical departments can thus save their time and money. If you arrange for a very small conference, you will learn how much time and money is spent on it and the result is nil.

Question: Our standard of education has fallen miserably. Western standards aside, our standard of education is lower than even that of India. Can you advise us on its improvement?

Abdul Qadir Khan: When I was minister of education in Karachi, the dates of examinations were never changed. Classes were held regularly and exams were held on time. Respect for teachers was equal to the respect the students held for their parents. Unfortunately, the era of the late President Ayub Khan ruined the system of education in Pakistan. Since then, we have continuously been on a downward trend. Politics are more in vogue than education in the educational institutes. Nobody has any respect for the teachers. Education takes from 6 to 7 years to complete instead of 4 years.

Fortunately, the president of Pakistan understands this difficulty. By appointing Dr Muhammad Afzal as minister of education, he has taken the first step toward education reforms. Dr Afzal is a very learned, competent, and experienced education specialist. He has sufficient experience in the technical field also. He has made statements on education without mincing words during the last few months. He is doing his best now to put the education system on the right path. You probably know that Hippocrates once said: "Extreme remedies are most appropriate for extreme diseases." It is most essential to ban all political and other activities which distract students from their education in the educational institutions. Our country is a developing country and we cannot afford such luxuries as studies which could be completed in 4 years taking 7 to 8 years to complete.

It is essential to hold examinations on time. Those male and female students who cannot complete their courses in time should be expelled and more hardworking students should be enrolled. If you do not treat this disease with a firm hand, it will continue in our country in addition to wasting time.

Question: Not only have the Pakistani mass media but the foreign media and technical experts have identified you as the founder of the Pakistani atomic program. Some patriotic elements have said that the Qu'ade A'zam laid the foundation of Pakistan and you with your work have guaranteed the security of Pakistan for all time. A foreign paper said that after the Qu'ade A'zam and Iqbal your name will remain alive in the history of Pakistan. The fact is that prior to the Kahuta project, our position in the atomic field was nil. Now we hold an honorable position, by the grace of God, in the Western world and in the world of Islam. All this is due to your sacrifices and research. Would you like to say anything in this respect?

Abdul Qadir Khan: Please understand that all the successes achieved by us in this important field have been aided by the president and the finance minister. It would have been almost impossible to complete this difficult and important task without their guidance and encouragement. As far we are concerned, I and my colleagues, we have only done our duty. Sacrifices were made by Pakistanis when Pakistan was created. Then later, the patriots sacrificed their lives in 1965 and 1971 without any grudge. My sacrifices and those of my colleagues are nothing compared with those referred to above. This is our country and it is our duty to serve and safeguard it.

When the time comes, God willing, you will not find us lacking in our duty as compared to others. We are grateful for those praises lavished on us by our brothers and sisters and we ask that when they pray, they should include us in their prayers and sacrifice everything for the progress and development of our country and the nation. We are very fortunate that God has given us this land. Look at the sacrifices and the hardships of the Palestinians. When you have no country of your own, then everybody treats you shabbily; they only praise you outwardly. Nobody helps you in any practical way. We should safeguard our country more than our own lives. This can only be done through education and honesty.

Question: Tell us something about your childhood?

Abdul Qadir Khan: You may have become aware through the papers and magazines that I was born in Bhopal. Bhopal was a well-known Muslim state in undivided India. Its people were simple and religious. There, I had never heard of factions or knew any existed before I came to Pakistan. Our city was full of mosques. The number of people who had memorized the Koran was greater in Bhopal than any other state or city. The late Nawab [Nobob] Hamidullah Khan was a very able person. His services to Pakistan are known to all.

People from Bhopal have been quite prominent among Pakistani officials. People like Ghulam Mohammad, Shoib Qureshi, Sir Muhammad Zafarullah Khan, and the late Allama Seyyed Sulaiman Nadvi lead the list. I have been saying my prayers in the wake of Sulaiman Nadvi. My grandfather and his father

served in the Army. My uncle Mahmud Khan was an official in the revenue department. Another uncle, Muhammad Amar Khan, was a magistrate and also served as a "divan" [high civil office]. My cousin, Himayat Ali Khan, was chief engineer. My father, the late Abdul Ghafur Khan, served as a headmaster in a high school and then as superintendent. He had a bachelor of arts degree from Nagpur University and he was very good in mathematics and the English language. He served at Dabulpore, Nagpur, (Bhasawal), and Akola. He preferred being a headmaster to being a superintendent so that he could be near the family and supervise our education.

Everybody in Bhopal was aware of his attachment to his family and everybody respected him. My father and mother had always helped the poor and had helped in their education. My father was a descendent of the famous Hakim Ajmal Khan and my maternal grandfather had been the commander of the Bhopal state force. My elder brother is a senior viksident in the state bank at Karachi.

I received my education up to matriculation in Bhopal. Even today, I become nostalgic when I recall the streets of Bhopal and the friends and companions I had there. Just consider Bhopal as a second Switzerland if you will. Hockey was very popular there. I was a good hockey player. I was also fond of fishing but I was quite crazy over kite flying and was also punished for that craze. However, I never quit kite flying. Rules regarding kite-fighting are different in Pakistan than Bhopal. There we would pull the line. Here in Pakistan the line is given slack to produce the same action. Here I believe the people would start a fight if the line is pulled. It was probably for this reason that I never touched kite flying after I came here.

In Europe, I played volleyball and played it well. In 1952, I arrived in Pakistan through Khokhropar walking on hot sand with a tin trunk on my head across the border from India. In Pakistan, I received my bachelor's degree and then went to Europe, about which you are well aware.

Question: There is one question that is in the mind of every Pakistani: Can Pakistan make an atomic bomb?

Abdul Qadir Khan: You have me cornered. I do not know whether to say yes or no. Either way, I get caught. First of all, I must say that our atomic program is peaceful. The president of Pakistan and the Pakistani Government have repeatedly offered assurances about this. We are doing all this for power production. The enriched uranium fuel at the Kahuta plant is for reactors which will be built to produce electricity. However, there is one point I would like to make clear. The whole world knows that the technique for making enriched uranium is a very difficult process. The first pilot plant for this purpose was set up in (Almelo).

Knowing the advantages of this modus operandi, Japan spent a large sum and is involved in building a plant. The United States has also started work on a \$10 billion plant which will be completed in 8-10 years. This modus operandi - lasers etc - has made no noticeable progress and there is not a single pilot plant or laboratory in the whole world.

A book and article published in 1983 confirm the fact. The question is now one of our abilities. We have made major strides in this difficult field and we have a team of patriotic scientists and extremely brilliant engineers and local experts in the fields of metallurgy, electronics, mechanical engineering, etc. which is not found elsewhere. In brief, Pakistan has a proficient and patriotic team capable of performing the most difficult tasks. Forty years ago no one was familiar with the secrets of the atom bomb and education was not so widespread, but American scientists did the job. Today, 40 years later, we have ended their monopoly in this most difficult field of the enrichment of uranium in only 10 years. This job is undoubtedly not beyond our reach. India achieved this 10 years ago, although other countries definitely assisted it. We have the capacity to complete such a task. This is a political decision in which my colleagues and I have no concern except for the sake of the country's safety and security. Our honorable president had to make such a momentous decision and we were entrusted with this duty. We, my friends and I, will stake our lives but we will not disappoint the country and the nation, by the grace of God. In short, I wish to say that if India could accomplish such a feat 10 years ago, we are not so abnormal or mentally retarded that we cannot do this, and God willing, we will do it better as we have proved in the field of uranium enrichment.

Question: By completing such an important project in such a short period, you and your associates have opened everyone's eyes, showing us that if we do something sincerely and honestly then we will definitely be successful. Do you have any other projects in mind which you and your team can complete in an appropriate manner and play a significant role in the country's progress?

Abdul Qadir Khan: President General Ziaul Haq, Finance Minister Ghulam Ishaq Khan, and their friends are fully aware of our capabilities and shortcomings. My friends and I have placed ourselves at their disposal and if we are entrusted with any task, we will not betray their confidence and we will not disappoint the country and the nation.

Question: What message do you have for the younger engineers and scientists of the country?

Abdul Qadir Khan: Honesty of motives, industriousness, and willingness to bear hardship for the service of Pakistan, which have been bestowed on us by God. Whenever you are entrusted with a job, read all the relevant literature and use the beneficial things in your practical work and cultivate the habit of reading in the evening. If they are certain that the leaders in their locality are really dishonest and are intentionally engaged in selfishness instead of the larger and higher interests of the nation, then they should not hesitate to voice their opinions.

Question: Are you fond of poetry?

Abdul Qadir Khan: It is only confined to reading and listening to lyrics. I listen to cassettes of Muni Begum and Malika Pukhraj and Master Ayaz Qawwal [Pakistani singers] and feel at peace. "For 100 years the profession of my ancestors has been

military, poetry has never been my form of livelihood." [Urdu verse]

Of course, I am very fond of cooking and I used to cook Pakistani food every day in Europe and my wife and children loved it. The children insist even now that I should make parathas [flat bread fried in butter] as they are better than the ones the cooks make. I am particularly adept in making pilaf, kebabs, qormah [spicy meat stew], curry, and vegetables. Since I returned, I have not had any time and I could not fulfill my children's requests.

Question: The Western countries have always threatened that Israel or India will destroy the (Kahorh) plant. After the barbaric assassination of Dr Yahya (al-Mashhad), the government should make some arrangements for your safety as well. Are you satisfied with the government measures?

Abdul Qadir Khan: The analogy with Iraq is not correct. The conditions in both countries are different. As far as the (Kahorh) plant or my safety are concerned, the arrangements made by the honorable president for myself and my colleagues are quite satisfactory. I do am not concerned for myself, it is in God's hands. At such a time, any amount of security arrangements are futile, but nothing will be achieved by eliminating me because we have a large number of intelligent and capable engineers and scientists who can set up another 100 plants like the one at (Kahorh). This technology is ours and we have achieved proficiency in it in this country. All the necessary equipment is produced in the country. It is the result of a venture which is 100 percent Pakistani. Eliminating me or a few other Pakistanis does

not eliminate this technology. If in the future the need arises, we will make 10 other plants like the (Kahorh) plant.

You and the Pakistani people can remain confident that the president and the government have considered every aspect of the matter and the necessary steps have been taken. As chief of the Army Staff and with 40 years of military experience, no other person is capable of understanding this as well as the president. This is why we do our work without any fear of danger and in a calm manner.

Question: Your wife is from Holland and her parents and relatives are there. Does she have any problems or experience any discomfort in Pakistan?

Abdul Qadir Khan: You know that Napoleon said that behind every successful man there is a woman. All my success is due to my wife who has given me the maximum cooperation and has encouraged me and has never once complained or argued about my lack of leisure time. My close friends are witnesses to the fact that she is more Pakistani than some Pakistanis. Contrary to some Pakistani women or foreign women married to Pakistanis, who have retained their nationalities and malign Pakistan and are unfaithful to the salt of the land even after partaking of it [reference to Pakistani proverb], my wife considers Pakistan her homeland and has gladly accepted Pakistani citizenship and like a true patriot has never ever found fault with it. Believe me, if my wife's moral support had not been forthcoming, then it would have been difficult, in fact, impossible for me to do my work peacefully and with the necessary concentration.

Faint, illegible text at the top of the page, possibly a header or title.

Faint, illegible text in the middle section of the page.

1952-1953

182 D  
2100  
3DRW  
4D10  
base  
Alu

J. BAZ/J

Faint, illegible text at the bottom of the page.

PAKISTAN SUCCEEDS IN ENRICHMENT OF URANIUM

Pakistani Scientist Dr. Abdul Qadeer has said Pakistan has a team of patriotic scientists who would make achievements in the field of nuclear technology. Pakistan nuclear programme ~~is successful but if Gen. Zia asked us to make a nuclear bomb we will not disappoint him.~~ Giving his first interview Dr. Qadeer told Nawa-i-Waqt that the Pakistani press boosted the morale of my family when a Dutch court sentenced me to four years imprisonment on charges of stealing 'nuclear secrets'. The government has filed an appeal against this unjust conviction, and Dr. Khurshid Haider, Pakistan envoy in Holland, has been personally persuing this case, he said. Answering a question he said Pakistan has brought to an end west's monopoly over nuclear technology. In view of the huge amounts spent and joint efforts made by western countries to acquire nuclear technology no one could expect such an achievement from Pakistan. France, he said refused to provide nuclear technology to Pakistan only because of west's enmity towards Islam. The propaganda about an 'Islamic Bomb' was also the product of the "Zionist mind" on the basis of which the western world made films and wrote books against us. He said the murder of Dr. Yahya, incharge of Iraqi nuclear programme in Paris and destruction of Iraqi nuclear reactor was in fact a part of Christian's enmity towards Islam. Speaking of India's nuclear plant he said in the enrichment of uranium Pakistan has left India far behind. Nuclear technology was at present being used in Pakistan in medical and agricultural fields and its scope might be enlarged in times to come. Dr. Qadeer believes India and America have been raising propaganda against Pakistan's nuclear programme to discourage the western countries from supplying the required equipment to Pakistan. Moreover making a nuclear bomb was not a difficult task and if India could make it ten years ago why could Pakistan not make it today. However, he said, making of a nuclear bomb was a political decision and if the government vested us with some responsibility in this context we will not disappoint it. Replying to a question about any denger from Israel to Pakistan's nuclear plant he said situation in Pakistan was totally different from that of Iraq and he was satisfied with the arrangements made by Gen. Zia. Any foreign power would gain nothing by having him killed because there were many other Pakistani scientists capable of establishing hundreds of Kahuta Plants.

Am. by all given  
Am. today's Jm.

Daily 'JANG' Rawalpindi

A.L.S.  
131

13 February 1984

Rawalpindi, 12 Feb (Radio Report) BBC has quoted the Pakistan government as saying that it has been investigating the validity of a report in which a local paper has attributed to a Pakistani scientist Dr. Abdul Qadeer a statement that Pakistan has joined the ranks of those countries who can enrich uranium. ~~But~~ The paper had also quoted him as saying that if Gen. Zia wished to strengthen Pakistan's defence, the country's nuclear scientists would not disappoint him. A Pakistan Official spokesman has described this interview as surprising. He would make no further comment till investigation in this respect was complete. The paper had also reported Dr. Qadeer as saying Pakistan had brought to an end West's monopoly over nuclear technology and that it had left India far behind in this field. He had further said Pakistan had a peaceful nuclear programme. The official spokesman did not give a clear reply when foreign journalists asked permission to interview Dr. Qadeer.



# STAR

## KINGS FASHION

(Mirzaco Tailors)

Allama Iqbal Road Opp. United Bakery

Phone: 433739

Editor: GHULAM NABI MANSURI

KARACHI, SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 11, 1978

### RESULTS CAN BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT EXPLOSION

# PAKISTAN CAN SET UP MANY MORE KAHUTA LIKE PLANTS



**SANTIAGO: Chile:** Policemen try to keep demonstrators from blocking a city street during a march held to demand an end to military rule in the sixth month.

#### STAR REPORT

**RAWALPINDI, Feb 11:** The eminent Pakistani scientist, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, has said that the setting off an atomic explosion was not necessary and the results obtained through such explosion can be achieved through various experiments carried out separately.

He further said that Pakistan now has the competence to set up many more Kahuta like nuclear reprocessing plants.

### Acceptance of College to to observ



Ministerie van Economische Zaken

- Aan
- 1. 1
- 2. 1
- 3. 1
- 4. 1
- 5. 1
- 6. 1
- 7. 1
- 8. 1

37A7

a;  
tlic;

s-Gravenhage  
Dir. Gen. hfd. Afd.  
Kenmerk  
Kiesnummer 10701

16.02.1984  
BA  
EZ/BA/0137/84  
796071

Werkgroep Bos.

Op verzoek van de heer Bovens doe ik U hierbij ter kennisneming  
copieën van enkele artikelen uit MUSLIM en DAWN betreffende de  
veroordeling van dr. Khan, toekomen.

Het Hoofd van de afdeling  
Bijzondere Aangelegenheden  
Beveiligingsambtenaar,

(R.C. Ackx)

Bijlagen

Postadres:  
Postbus 201  
2200 CA 's-Gravenhage

PAKISTAN

*afkomstig van de "Foreign Broadcast  
Information Service"  
v.l. Amerikaanse  
ministrie van Handel.*

COMMENTARY ON NETHERLANDS CASE AGAINST PAKISTANI SCIENTIST

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 10 Dec 83 p 4

[Article in the "Spectrum" column by Khalid Akhtar: "Dr A.Q. Khan's Affairs"]

[Text] We are now quite familiar with the pattern of the smear campaign intermittently launched against our peaceful nuclear programme. It has been orchestrated to play a certain tune, the tempo going up and down, according to the need of the given time and occasion. The whole thing has been planned so immaculately that we have been kept on the defensive all the time.

Our response to the Jewish-Indian lobby to keep us away from nuclear technology has remained a weak and fragile one. At decisive and crucial moments we have tumbled leaving ourselves wide open for all kinds of speculations. We are not making the 'Islamic Bomb' and most of our adversaries know it. But this is not enough to beat back the tirade against our modest nuclear programme. We may take satisfaction in that whatever we are saying is nothing except the truth. But the truth loses its validity if not applied when it should be.

If ever there was a need to defend our nuclear programme it was in the case of Dr A.Q. Khan. Here was our most eminent scientist, head of our most important nuclear project, who was being persecuted by a Dutch court and we watched it as if this did not concern us. Not for a moment it crossed our minds that it was not Dr Khan who was on trial, but it was our nuclear programme facing judgement and that a verdict against Dr Khan would not be a verdict against the scientist but against our nuclear programme.

Now Dr Khan stands 'convicted' in absentia to four-year terms for attempting to get a nuclear secret. This will make the West relaunch its campaign against our nuclear programme with lot more vigour. The judgement will be blown up out of all proportion and given multiple dimensions. We will soon start feeling that it 'bites.'

The way the verdict has come about indicates that substantial thinking has gone on behind the move to "corner Pakistan" on the nuclear issue. It needs no argument to convince the world that nuclear secrets do not travel by post, and certainly not when a Third World country like Pakistan is involved.

(After all, Dr Khan has only sought certain harmless information from his former colleague in the Netherlands through a letter). Secondly, the Dutch government has suddenly realised after six years that an attempt was made to get a nuclear secret smuggled out of the country. (Dr Khan had sought information as far back as 1977). All this shows that the "Western allies" had been waiting for an opportunity to 'hook' Pakistan. And when they got the opportunity they did not spare us no matter how flimsy the grounds.

The more important question is: why Pakistan silently watched the persecution of its top scientist. Did it dismiss the whole thing as an insignificant affair. Did our Foreign Office remain uninformed about the plot to malign our scientist and nuclear programme. If the answer is in affirmative the ignorance has cost us dearly. Whatever may be the case the lapse has been too great to be allowed to go by unnoticed.

Happily the government has now moved to fight Dr Khan's case both in a court of law and at official levels. While the legal battle will take its own course it is hoped that the Foreign Office will step in strongly to remedy the wrong done to our country's celebrated scientist citizen.

Dr Khan may have felt deserted and disillusioned. His changing for being 'convicted' for the 'crime' which he had not committed--must be great. He has become a 'bad guy' for the West for being a crucial factor in Pakistan's nuclear programme. But in his sufferings he has emerged as a hero, the heart beat of the million of Muslims. This is Dr Khan's reward for the services he has rendered to the nation and ummah. His 'conviction' is a "badge of honour" for himself, Pakistan and the Muslim ummah.

CSO: 4 600/211

CONVICTION OF SCIENTIST BY DUTCH COURT CRITICIZED

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 8 Dec 83 pp 1, 8

[Article by Ashraf Hashmi: "Dr A.Q. Khan Case: Pakistan's Response Should Be Hard-Hitting"]

[Text] Islamabad, Dec 6--The Government of Pakistan is understood to have decided to take the case of the country's renowned and respected scientist Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan to a superior Dutch court as an appeal against the judgment of a lower court of that country sentencing the Pakistani nuclear scientist to four years imprisonment in absentia on the most ridiculous and flimsiest charges of attempting to obtain some insignificant classified information from one of his old assistants in 1976-77 by writing a letter from Pakistan.

The Law Ministry is said to have fully studied the case and was in the process of engaging some lawyers to represent Dr Khan's case in one of the superior courts in Holland. The Foreign Office is also taking up the matter with the Dutch Government.

Commenting on the judgment announced on Nov 14 by the Amsterdam court legal experts described it as classic in legal history. They said the question asked by Dr Khan is reported to have concerned some information on one of thousands of complicated and sophisticated components and instruments used in an ultracentrifuge machine and plant. But the public prosecutor deliberately misled the court on the consequences of the information had it been given. The prosecutor, they said, foolishly tried to paint a doomsday for the world if this insignificant information was made available to Dr Khan. To suggest that by obtaining a tyre of a F-16, Dr Khan would make thousands of F-16 and annihilate the entire world is a mischief of the greatest order.

Everybody who is any body in centrifuge technology fully knows that information related to a single component is useless itself as a centrifuge consists of hundreds of highly sophisticated and precision components made from exotic materials. The process to run a centrifuge, to put up cascades and to be able to separate isotopes is a herculean task requiring thousands of millions of dollars. The time taken by the Europeans and the Japanese to accomplish the job is reported to be about 20 years.

These legal experts expressed the view that Dr Khan never got an answer to his letter but the Dutch judiciary woke up suddenly after six years of long slumber and convicted our most well-known and able nuclear scientist on these flimsy grounds of so-called an attempted crime in a foreign country. The unprecedented haste and deliberate act to prosecute Dr Khan is evident from the fact that he was not informed of the court proceedings, no summons were served on him though the public prosecutor, the Dutch police and the Dutch Embassy in Islamabad knew his address. Thus no chance was given to him to defend himself.

However, when Dr Khan came to know about the case from a newspaper sent to him from Holland he immediately sent express telegrams to the judge informing her of his shock and surprise at the case and for not being given the opportunity to defend himself. As the world news media later confirmed, the judge did get those telegrams in time but in order to satisfy the guilty conscience of the Dutch bureaucracy the judge prosecuted Dr Khan and closed the proceedings in an hour.

The question arises: why all this haste? The Dutch judiciary has a tradition of fairness, impartiality and independence. The answer is not difficult to find. There have been massive demonstrations throughout Europe against the development of lethal and dangerous American nuclear weapons and Holland is in the forefront. The people there have been agitating violently against the deployment of missiles and the judge had to order the court to be vacated during the proceedings against Dr Khan as hundreds of demonstrators shouted slogans against the government for making Dr Khan a scape-goat for her policy. The people picketed with placards outside the court to protest against the case. By convicting Dr Khan one legal expert said, the judge and the Dutch Government wanted to play the Good Guy who punished a "criminal," who, though he did not obtain any information, tried to know about a non-significant piece of know-how. However, if the Dutch Government, he asked, was so hard on such a small matter, how could it be a party to the "spread of nuclear weapons." A nice comedy for public consumption at Dr Khan's cost!

The law applied, they said, itself has no international legal value. You can make any law as long as it applies to your own citizens and nationals and to your own soil. "You cannot thrust them on a foreign country or a foreigner in a foreign country. If we, the law experts added, follow the Dutch law in question, the entire world would become a world of criminals and prosecutors. It will not only be against international code or conduct but also an infringement of sovereignty of an independent state if anybody tries to apply his own laws on a foreign country or a foreigner in a foreign country. If it was not so, they said, the Russian, the American and the Cuban courts would be busy prosecuting nationals of each other.

The charge against Dr Khan that he wrote a letter to someone asking for some information was most ridiculous as anybody can write a letter to Mr Reagan or to Mr Andropov and ask for information on ICBMs or H-bomb. You just ignore or refuse the request. No crime is done. If you give the information then you are committing a crime against your own country and are liable to prosecution according to your own law, they concluded.

The judgment of the Dutch court has been sharply resented by the people of the country. They believe that the prosecution and conviction of Dr Khan is not the conviction of an individual Pakistani. Dr Khan is not only a senior government official but is the pride of the nation. By convicting him the Dutch and the West have convicted Pakistan's nuclear programme and humiliated the nation's pride. The government, they said, should not remain idle as it was incumbent on it to respond strongly in a hard-hitting manner to the judgment of a publicity hungry judge of a small court, ignorant of international code of conduct. The public prosecutor lied to the judge, who being a layman not being able to comprehend the technicalities of these accusations accepted the stupid assertions made by the prosecutors.

The government, these circles maintained, must not sit idle till the mischief is removed and the court verdict is reversed and declared null and void. Dr Qadeer Khan must be exonerated of all these mischevous and fabricated charges. He is our most brilliant nuclear scientist who has put Pakistan prominently on the world map of nuclear technology. He has broken the monopoly of the West in the field of uranium enrichment and has shown the way to developing countries that given the determination, the obstacles of Western technological dominance can be broken even in such a sophisticated field as the enrichment of uranium.

There is one more point on which Dr Khan has shown the way to others and won the admiration of the entire nation and that is his selflessness. We hear of so many Pakistani "top scientists and engineers" working abroad and so "keen" and impatient to "serve" their homeland. The patriotic way they want to serve Pakistan is to work abroad, enjoy the luxuries of the host countries, make short trips to Pakistan as adviser at Pakistan's expense, give some unpractical advice and go back. When they show some interest to come, they want to come on their own terms and want to live like foreign executives in their own country whereas in the countries of residence they are unknown and dispensable. Dr Khan came to Pakistan without any preconditions, without any demand of exorbitant salary or facilities. He just came and put his heart and soul to give his best to the country. Everybody knows that even today he is not paid more than senior civil servant or more than his own colleagues and has never aspired for any facilities or benefits on the basis of what he has given to Pakistan.

CSO: 4600/213

## DUTCH VERDICT AGAINST SCIENTISTS SEEN BASED ON SUPPOSITION

Karachi DAWN in English 11 Dec 83 p 9

[Article by S.A.R.: "Dutch Court's Verdict Based on Suppositions"]

[Text]

'DUTCH Court Convicts Dr. Qadeer'. So read a headline in a local newspaper the other day. I was shocked. Couldn't believe my eyes. What on earth could warrant his conviction? Of what was he guilty? How could a court convict a foreign national? These and a host of other questions started echoing in my mind, filling it with the most disturbing reverberations. I could not sit tight; jumped on my feet, and phoned Qadeer — a family friend whom I know so well. We agreed to meet at dinner.

Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, none who knows him will disagree, is a modest, humble soul utterly shy of publicity. But destiny has placed him right under the spotlight of vested Western media and put him at the centre of attention of those who tire not of speaking of a so-called 'Islamic Bomb' the prospects of which exist only in their imagination. At first he did not agree to open his mouth on the subject. But in the end I was, luckily I think, able to persuade him to talk.

The High Court of Amsterdam sentenced him on November 14 to four years imprisonment in absentia for trying to obtain classified information in 1977 some years after he had left the Netherlands for Pakistan. Did you mark the words

"trying to obtain" and "after he had left the Netherlands?" Simply put, it means that the honourable Dutch court convicted him of an uncommitted 'crime'. The prosecution counsel admitted that Dr. Khan did not steal any classified information while in Holland. So, even the charge of "trying to obtain" the said information related to a time when the accused was in Pakistan and thus had a complete and indisputable alibi. How could he then be convicted? Beats me'.

## 'Classified' information

Dr. Khan was found guilty of trying to obtain classified information. I could not understand how he did it sitting thousands of miles away. So I asked him. What happened was like this: while coming to Pakistan, he was told by his friend, Mr Veerman of the FDO, to let him know of anything he needed from Holland for his research project. During the R and D work, Dr. Khan happened to require information about bottom damper. Remembering the offer made by Mr. Veerman, he wrote to his friend and requested for some information. His good friend never replied. The information never arrived. Yet, Dr. Khan's letter was used as the only evidence by the prosecution to prove the charge against him. Have you ever heard of a weaker ground for conviction? At least I haven't.

I have talked to a number of senior, experienced lawyers. They all maintain that writing a letter



seeking some information does not constitute an attempt to commit an offence. What is the universally recognised set of definitions of the word "attempt" in legal parlance?

Halsbury's "Law of England" defines the word in the fourth edition of Volume II on page 49 at para 64 as follows:

"An attempt is any overt act immediately connected with the commission of an offence and forming part of a series of acts which, if not interrupted or frustrated or abandoned, would result in the commission of the completed offence. Acts remotely connected towards the commission of an offence cannot constitute an offence is not sufficiently proximate and it is not an attempt merely to procure materials with which to commit the offence".

In "Corpus Juris Secundum", a treatise by Francis J. Ludes, (Vol. 22 para 73) the expression 'attempt' has been defined as an act done with intent to commit a crime, beyond mere preparation, but falling short of its actual commission.

Similarly, the American and English Encyclopaedia of Law (Vol. III page 250, Edition II) offers the following definition:

"An act done in part execution of criminal design amounting to more than mere preparation, but falling short of actual consummation, and possessing, except for failure of consummation, all the elements of the substantive crime".

Now, these are definitions given by world authorities on the subject. Applying them to what Dr. Qadeer Khan did, one can easily conclude that even if a letter had been written, the mere writing of it from Pakistan, soliciting some information from somebody in Holland, cannot constitute an offence or an attempt to commit an offence. To believe otherwise is to fly in the face of justice.

### Invalid charge

Even if we naively suppose for the sake of argument that writing the said letter was tantamount to an attempt to commit offence, how can we ignore the fact that its writer is not a Dutch national and that the letter was written from outside the Netherlands? By convicting him, the Amsterdam High Court has given extra-territorial jurisdic-

tion to the municipal laws of Holland and applied them to a citizen of an independent sovereign State even when the act complained of was not committed on the Dutch soil. This amounts to condemning a person without hearing him. I cannot believe that any norm of international law allows it.

Here I am tempted to recall a Press report published only a few days ago saying that the Sri Lanka Government has decided not to take legal action against the BBC for misrepresenting the events in that country. The Sri Lankan Attorney-General said that any attempt by the State to assume jurisdiction in respect of acts committed in another country by foreign nationals might be considered as an infringement of sovereignty. How correct!

As opposed to the Sri Lankan Attorney-General, what did the Dutch Public Prosecutor do? He initiated proceedings against a foreign national for an act not even committed. The matter was not stopped at that. In their enthusiasm, perhaps to find a scapegoat for the guilty Dutch conscience, they over-exceeded their powers and jurisdiction and sentenced him. Prima facie, the conviction has thus no legal standing and needs to be declared null and avoid.

The invalidity of the charge against Dr. Khan and the non-jurisdiction of the Dutch Court needing no more elaboration, let me now turn to the contention about the significance of the information sought by him.

A centrifuge is said to be a highly sophisticated machine consisting of hundreds of high precision components having very tight tolerances. If the number, sophistication and complexity of all the components of a plant are viewed in their entirety and are taken into consideration, the bottom damper appears to be less than a tiny drop of water in the sea, the presence or absence of which is of no significance or value by itself. Moreover, it is a mechanical part which has hundred and one other industrial uses. One must also realise that the importance or value of a bottom damper is zero compared to the equipment sold or supplied openly by the FDO and all the Western

countries. This includes equipment connected with a centrifuge R and D programme.

That being the case, where does the Dutch Public Prosecutor's argument stand? His contention that had Dr. Khan got information about bottom damper, he would have made enriched uranium which would have had grave consequences for mankind disappears in thin air at the touch of reality. It looks as if coming straight out of a fairy tale — a figment of wild imagination and not an iota more than that.

Students of law will also readily dismiss it as presumptuous. 'Had this been done, that would have happened' is hardly a legalistic approach and certainly not one on which court decisions should be based. As such, legally speaking, the learned Judge's decision is based on suppositions and surmises, is most extraordinary, out of context and highly exaggerated.

Why was such a 'Dutch treat' arranged for Dr. Khan? I can think of only two reasons: one, the Dutch authorities needed some kind of sprinkler to cool down the anti-nuclear feelings at home which are reportedly linked with some important personalities; and, second, propaganda in the Western media portraying Dr. Khan as a villain.

On the issue of using some one as a scapegoat to seek a temporary advantage, the less said the better. It is naive to fire guns from the shoulders of others. The truth may be suppressed temporarily. It cannot be swept under the carpet permanently.

The second point — international propaganda — needs a little more detailed examination. The Western media has been for years now jumping, as vultures would attack a corpse, and carrying out a vicious campaign never seen before against a person or a country. Blatant lies have been spread con-

tinuously and deliberately as a part of a well orchestrated effort carefully planned and meticulously executed. The BBC took pains to produce a programme telling concocted stories and quoting people out of fictitious context. Even a book has been published on the so-called 'Islamic Bomb'.

## Western propaganda

The answer to these questions is simple. The Western world refuses to recognise the right of the Third World countries to acquire knowledge in the sophisticated branches of modern science and technology. They continue to treat it as their sole monopoly and deny the Third World any significant share of it. They do not want the developing countries to shed their dependence on the industrialised nations in any important field of development activity.

This regrettable attitude of the Western world comes under a sharper focus where the Muslim countries are concerned as there the contrivances and manipulations of the Zionist lobby come into play with full force. Their influence over the Western media put its full weight behind the propaganda against Pakistan which wishes to acquire nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. This determination of Pakistan is too much for the Zionist lobby to stomach. Dr. Qadeer Khan's story is a part of that fabrication. Spices are occasionally added to make it saleable.

Concoctions and wild-running imaginations may have made the 'Dr. Khan Story' fanciful and interesting for the readers. Even a member of the judiciary of a civilized country seems to have been carried away by it. This is a mockery of the highly revered values of justice in the Netherlands in particular and the world in general. Will some one's conscience prick to correct the wrong?—S.A.R.

MEMORANDUM 25/847

Van: ANPO  
Aan: DIO/OV/NW en DRW/AT  
Onderwerp: Pakistan nucleair.

Datum: 9 maart 1984

Ten gevolge van "administratieve verlegging" heb ik U helaas niet eerder copie toegestuurd van een Memorandum met bijlagen van DAL/WZ van 3 februari jl. over Pakistan nucleair.  
./.. Ik zend U de betrokken stukken hierbij alsnog toe.

1506-8-72

12/2

MEMORANDUM

*Maas geeft definitieve  
reactie vdd 21/5.*

Van: Van Galen Last *89/3*

Datum: 9 maart 1984

Aan: de Heren Holtslag (Kab. MP), Bos en Weiss (EZ) en Schutte (Justitie)

Onderwerp: Kamervragen n.a.v. rapport Commissie Holtslag

Hierbij doe ik U ontwerptekst voor het antwoord op vraag 3 van de Vaste Commissie voor Buitenlandse Zaken m.b.t. het rapport Holtslag toekomen. Gaarne verneem ik Uw eventueel commentaar.

V.w.b. de antwoorden op de eerste twee vragen kan ik U mededelen, dat deze door mij zijn voorgelegd aan de juridisch adviseur van BZ\*, die indertijd deel heeft uitgemaakt van de werkgroep. Deze heeft mij toegezegd uiterlijk 19 maart a.s. zijn commentaar te zullen geven.

Overigens heeft nadere bestudering van het ontwerpantwoord op vraag 2 een vermoedelijke vergissing aan het licht gebracht: 9e regel van boven moet vermoedelijk zijn "krachtens section 302 van de NNPA 1978, gewijzigde paragraaf 57b van de Atomic Energy Act etc."

\* *Mv. Maas Jeenteraans*

Vergaderjaar 1983-1984

*besprek i pover  
bos op 29/2.*

16 082

Onderzoek zaak-Khan

*nr. 1 de bijz.  
Commissie.*

*tel. bespreken met  
hr. Schutte en met  
Drs v. Galen last*

*Heide  
(7/11/84)*

Nr. 11

LIJST VAN VRAGEN

Vastgesteld 16 februari 1984

De vaste Commissie voor Buitenlandse Zaken<sup>1</sup> zou graag – naar aanleiding van de brieven van de minister van Justitie van 14 oktober met het bijbehorende rapport van de interdepartementale werkgroep – antwoord van de Regering ontvangen op de volgende vragen:

1

De minister onderschrijft het oordeel van een ambtelijke werkgroep dat een voorziening als in de Amerikaanse Nuclear Nonproliferation Act 1978 moet worden ontraden, omdat een dergelijke voorziening naar het algemeen volkenrecht niet toelaatbaar zou zijn. In hoeverre ondermijnt deze uitspraak het beleid om verspreiding van kernwapens tegen te gaan?

2

Waarom kan in de Amerikaanse wetgeving genoemde wettelijke voorziening wel opgenomen worden? Is de Amerikaanse voorziening in strijd met het algemeen volkenrecht?

3

Welke nieuwe mogelijkheden ter voorkoming van misbruik van kennis van gevoelige nucleaire technologie ziet het kabinet thans nog?

De voorzitter van de commissie,  
Ter Beek

De griffier van de commissie,  
De Beaufort

<sup>1</sup> Samenstelling:

Leden: Van der Mei (CDA), Van der Spek (PSP), Ter Beek (PvdA), voorzitter, Schoften (de groep Schoften/Dijkman), Aarts (CDA), De Waadsteniet (CDA), Patijn (PvdA), Meijer (PvdA), Engwirda (D'66), Stemerdink (PvdA), De Boer (CDA), ondervoorzitter, Beckers-de Groot (PvdA), Guaktherie van Weezel (CDA), Van den Bergh (PvdA), Nijpels (VVD), Frinking (CDA), Blaauw (VVD), Wagenaar (RPF), De Waart (PvdA), Wallace (PvdA), Van den Toorn (CDA), Brouwer (CPN), Ubels-Veen (EVP), Voorhoeve (VVD), Weisglas (VVD), Van Heemskerck Pittis-Duvekot (VVD).  
P.v. leden: G. C. van Dam (CDA), Knof (PvdA), Couprie (CDA), Van der Linden (CDA), Tazelaar (PvdA), Den Uyl (PvdA), Wessel-Tuinstra (D'66), Poppe (PvdA), Beinema (CDA), Van Iersel (CDA), Herkens (PvdA), Evenhuis (VVD), B. de Vries (CDA), Waalkens (VVD), Van Possum (SGP), K. G. de Vries (PvdA), Zijlstra (PvdA), Schutte (GPV), Jacobse (VVD), Den Ouden-Dekkers (VVD), Terpstra (VVD).



Mr. J.J.E. Schutte

Drs. J.W. Holtslag (AZ)  
Mr. J. Bos (EZ)  
/Drs. A.J. van Galen Last (BuiZa)  
Mr. G.W. Maas Geesteranus (BuiZa)

Uw brief

Ons kenmerk

Onderwerp **Onderzoek zaak-Khan  
(Kamerstukken 16082)**

Datum **15 maart 1984**

Doorkiesnummer **706841**

Bij deze doe ik U een herziene en aangevulde versie toekomen van de concept-antwoorden op de lijst van vragen van de vaste Commissie voor Buitenlandse Zaken van de Tweede Kamer, opgenomen in Kamerstuk 16082, nr. 11.

Ik verzoek U mij te doen weten tot welke opmerkingen deze versie U aanleiding geeft.

met vriendelijke groet,

bijlage(n)

1. Het rapport van de ambtelijke werkgroep bevat niet de uitspraak dat de onderzochte bepaling van de Amerikaanse Nuclear Non-proliferation Act 1978 naar algemeen volkenrecht niet toelaatbaar zou zijn. De werkgroep heeft integendeel gesteld dat enerzijds het algemeen volkenrecht staten een betrekkelijk ruime marge laat bij het vestigen van extraterritoriale rechtsmacht, maar dat anderzijds, waar het aankomt op de daadwerkelijke handhaving van de vastgestelde wetgeving, de opportuniteit van die wetgeving aan twijfel onderhevig is, wanneer die handhaving niet anders dan aan de hand van volkenrechtelijk ontoelaatbare maatregelen is te bewerkstelligen. Uitdrukkelijk heeft de werkgroep daar aan toegevoegd, dat op concrete regels van algemeen volkenrecht, die het de wetgever zouden verbieden voor Nederland regels in navolging van de Amerikaanse wetgeving vast te stellen, niet kan worden gewezen. Omdat de in het eerste gedeelte van de vraag bedoelde uitspraak derhalve niet is gedaan, behoeft de in het tweede gedeelte gestelde vraag geen beantwoording.

2. De vraag waarom in de Amerikaanse wetgeving een wettelijke voorziening als in het rapport besproken wel kan worden opgenomen is niet aan mij, maar aan de Amerikaanse wetgever ter beantwoording. Ik onderschrijf de conclusie van de ambtelijke werkgroep dat op geen concrete regels van algemeen volkenrecht kan worden gewezen, die het een nationale wetgever zouden verbieden de besproken wetgeving vast te stellen.

Dat jurisdictieregelingen, die bepaalde gedragingen van natuurlijke of rechtspersonen in het buitenland aan een vergunningenregime onderwerpen, bij overtreding op straffe te handhaven, onder omstandigheden in strijd met algemeen volkenrecht kunnen komen, is uitgesproken door de Europese Commissie en

naar aanleiding van de in 1982 door de Amerikaanse wetgever vastgestelde wijzigingen van de artikelen 376.12, 379.8 en 385.2 van de Export Administration Regulations. Krachtens deze wijzigingen werd het personen in derde landen verboden materialen of onderdelen t.b.v. het onderzoek, de productie, het transport of de raffinage van olie of aardgas verder uit te voeren naar bepaalde andere landen, zonder vergunning van de Amerikaanse overheid, voor zover hetzij die personen van Amerikaanse nationaliteit waren, ongeacht de oorsprong van de desbetreffende materialen of onderdelen, hetzij die

materialen of onderdelen met behulp van Amerikaanse technologie waren vervaardigd, ongeacht de nationaliteit van de exporterende onderneming. De organen van de Europese Gemeenschap achtten deze regeling, die inmiddels is ingetrokken, ontoelaatbaar, omdat de daarin voorziene rechtsmacht op geen der in het algemeen volkenrecht aanvaarde jurisdictiebeginselen kon worden gebaseerd (Europe Documents, nr. 1216, 12 augustus 1982). Tot dezelfde conclusie kwam de President van de Haagse rechtbank in zijn uitspraak in kort geding van 17 september 1982, RW 1982, 167. Hoewel de genoemde artikelen van de Export Administration Regulations en het bij en krachtens de gewijzigde § 57b van de Atomic Energy Act bepaalde niet volledig vergelijkbaar zijn kan toch op enkele overeenkomsten tussen beide regelingen worden gewezen:

Zo beogen beide regelingen vat te krijgen op met Amerikaanse gegevens in het buitenland vervaardigde of te vervaardigen producten, door een bepaalde verbreiding van die gegevens of producten aan een vergunning van de Amerikaanse overheid te onderwerpen. Het aldus handelen zonder vergunning levert onder beide regelingen een strafbaar feit op.

Deze overeenkomsten tussen beide regelingen geven voldoende grond om verenigbaarheid van de besproken bepaling van de Nuclear Non-proliferation Act 1978 met het algemeen volkenrecht discutabel te laten zijn.

Een definitieve uitspraak daarover doe ik niet. Doorslaggevend is voor mij nl. dat een bepaling als onderzocht zich uit een oogpunt van algemene beginselen van Nederlandse wetgeving moeilijk in onze rechtsorde laat inpassen.

3. De suggestie om naar analogie van de Amerikaanse Nuclear Non-proliferation Act 1978 nucleaire kennisdragers aan voorschriften te binden is door de Regering zorgvuldig onderzocht. Men dient zich daarbij echter wel te realiseren dat het zou gaan om een mogelijk aanvullende maatregel bij het reeds beschikbare instrumentarium om misbruik van kennis van gevoelige nucleaire technologie te voorkomen. Ik mag in dit verband verwijzen naar

- a) de ministeriële beschikking van 24 september 1971, waarbij UC-technologie onder het Geheimhoudingsbesluit Kernenergiwet werd gebracht;
- b) de beschikking van 14 november 1980, waarbij ook de opwerkingstechnologie onder dat Geheimhoudingsbesluit is gebracht; en



c) de uitbreiding van de bijlage bij het Uitvoerbesluit Strategische Goederen 1963 met een nieuwe post 2000 "drukwerken en andere schriftelijke stukken, en andere goederen bestemd of geschikt voor het overdragen van kennis, een en ander voor zover daarin technologie is vastgelegd betreffende het ontwerpen, de vervaardiging of het gebruik van de in deze bijlage bedoelde goederen, tenzij deze is bekend gemaakt in algemeen toegankelijke publikaties".

De omstandigheid, dat de meergenoemde suggestie niet wordt opgevolgd betekent derhalve geenszins, dat de regering niet over voldoende mogelijkheden beschikt om misbruik van sensitieve nucleaire kennis tegen te gaan.

MEMORANDUM 36/84

Van: ANPO

Datum: 11 april 1984

Aan: AVE/VG via PLVS

Onderwerp: Pakistan nucleair; zoekraken code op Ambassade Islamabad.

./.

Bijgaand treft U aan een brief van Ambassadeur Peyra te Islamabad van 1 dezer, waarin deze doet weten dat een aan de Ambassade toegezonden copie van een codeverslag omtrent mijn gesprek met de DG van de IAEA over diens besprekingen in Pakistan, op de Ambassade "onvindbaar" blijkt te zijn. Het betreft hier de code nr. 6712 van PV IAEA van 19 maart jl. dat naar de heer Pronk mij heeft doen weten op 21 maart aan Islamabad in copie per koerier is toegezonden.

Gezien de gevoeligheid welke het dossier Pakistan-nucleair heeft, vergt het zoekraken van een codebericht op de Ambassade in Islamabad over juist deze materie m.i. enige speciale aandacht. Ik moge U derhalve in overweging geven volgens de geëigende procedures bij de Ambassade in Islamabad verdere navraag te doen over het lot van de betrokken codecopie.

5

AMBASSADE VAN HET KONINKRIJK DER NEDERLANDEN

ROYAL NETHERLANDS  
EMBASSY

*Dio/ov* ANPO n.f.  
DIO/WT  
DIO/ov.c.

No. 1853/294

96543  
9984502

Islamabad, 1 april 1984

Ond.: Pakistan nucleair, gesprek met DG Blix

*21/III / cpm  
de memo van  
Solomets*

Gaarne zeg ik U dank voor toezending van een copie aan deze Ambassade van memorandum 33/84 van ANPO aan DIO/OV, gedateerd 21 maart 1984, over bovenvermeld onderwerp. Vooral de daarbij gevoegde bijlagen hadden mijn belangstelling.

5

*Er is al een copie  
niet i.t.*

Dit memorandum diende ter completering van een eerder verslag (van 14 maart) over een gesprek dat ANPO voerde met de Director General van het I.A.E.A., Dr H. Blix. Tot mijn spijt blijkt een aan de Ambassade toegezonden copie van dat eerdere verslag onvindbaar, zodat ik U moge verzoeken mij, zo mogelijk, alsnog een copie ervan te doen toekomen. *gestuurd 21/3/84*

Van deze gelegenheid maak ik gebruik U, voor het nut dat zulks kan hebben, een exemplaar toe te sturen van een artikel van de hand van zekere Dr. F. Hassan in het wekelijkse bijvoegsel van het hier verschijnende dagblad "The Muslim" van 16 maart j.l. Het artikel is getiteld "An analysis of propaganda against Pakistan's peaceful nuclear programme". Hoewel het geen nieuws bevat is het een goede samenvatting voor diegenen die in Pakistan's problemen en prestaties op het gebied van kern-onderzoek en het (zelfstandig) ontwikkelen van nucleaire technologie geïnteresseerd zijn. Ik moge lezing ervan derhalve aanbevelen.

De Ambassadeur,

B.C. Peyra

Het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken  
T.a.v.: ANPO  
te  
's-Gravenhage